A Cultural Perspective on Intergroup Relations and Social Identity

James H. Liu

Victoria University of Wellington, james.liu@vuw.ac.nz
A Cultural Perspective on Intergroup Relations and Social Identity

Abstract

Violent instances of intergroup conflict in recent memory have usually involved cultural groups, but theory and research on the psychology of intergroup relations is largely culture free. The two most prominent theories, realistic group conflict theory (RGCT) and social identity/self-categorization theory (SIT/SCT) provide fundamental insight into basic processes in intergroup relations: (1) that behavior in intergroup situations is qualitatively different than that involved in interpersonal situations (including transformations of the self and relationships with others), (2) competition over material resources is the driver for intergroup conflict, but psychological identification with a group is sufficient to produce ingroup favoritism, and (3) social comparisons between groups provide psychological fuel for intergroup conflict. Social representations of history, encompassing shared knowledge about history and its meaning distributed across different groups, can be used to derive a more culture-specific approach to understanding intergroup relations. Empirical results show that popular history is a story about politics and war, and that historical symbols are part of cultural narratives that can be used to mobilize public opinion and construct national identity. Universal processes of intergroup relations and social identity are constrained by societal belief structures, which in turn are responsive to the identity and generational processes involved in collective remembering.

Creative Commons License

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 License.

This article is available in Online Readings in Psychology and Culture: http://scholarworks.gvsu.edu/orpc/vol5/iss3/5
Introduction

While the most violent instances of intergroup conflict in recent memory have usually involved cultural groups, particularly those of ethnicity, nationality, and religion, theory and research on intergroup relations in psychology is largely culture free. Two of the most prominent theories, realistic group conflict theory (Sherif, 1966) and social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) provide profound insight into some of the universal causes of and resolutions to intergroup conflict. These theories converge on the conclusion that interpersonal behavior is qualitatively different from intergroup behavior. As we shall see, different cognitive, motivational, and social structures govern behavior in intergroup compared to interpersonal situations.

Mainstream social psychological theory furnishes an overall understanding of the processes involved in intergroup conflict, but falls short of explaining the psychological bases of protracted and difficult to resolve conflicts between ethnic and national groups, like those in Northern Ireland or Israel. In these cases, a “culture of conflict” has emerged (Bar-Tal, 2000, 2001; Hammack, 2011). To understand such conflict and its resolution, social and cross-cultural psychologists have developed ways to operationalize the political culture of a society and apply this to intergroup relations. One such approach is to study social representations (Moscovici, 1988) of history (Liu & Hilton, 2005), because such historical representations popularly center around intergroup conflict (Liu et al., 2009, 2012). These representations provide powerful arguments for validating national identities (Liu, Lawrence, Ward, & Abraham, 2002), facilitating or preventing intergroup forgiveness after war (Hanke et al., in press), justifying social movements (Liu & Gastardo-Conaco, 2011), legitimizing the claims of one group against another group for restitution or its denial (Liu, Wilson, McClure, & Higgins, 1999; Sibley, Liu, Duckitt, & Khan, 2008). They limit the ways in which groups can make favorable social comparisons against one another. They motivate cultural continuity (Gezentsvey-Lamy, Ward, & Liu, in press; Sani et al., 2007).

The feedback loop between representations of history, social identities, and public policies and commemorations (Olick & Robbins, 1998) creates a cultural background to understand intergroup conflict (Liu & Allen, 1999). This incorporates culture into the more universal approaches that are typical of traditional social psychology. Perhaps the most fundamental universals about intergroup conflict are expressed by realistic group conflict theory, so this is the best place to begin.

Realistic Group Conflict Theory

Realistic group conflict theory emerged in the 1960’s out of an era when a more individual-level approach, authoritarian personality theory (Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswick, Levinson, & Sanford, 1950; see Altemeyer, 1996 for a contemporary approach to right-wing authoritarianism), was dominant. It carries the classic insight of social psychology, that it is the structure of the situation, not personal characteristics of the individual (or an aggregate of individuals) that determines human behavior (Sherif, 1966). According to the theory, intergroup conflict is caused by an incompatibility of goals regarding material resources. It
is the struggle over such material resources as land, oil, gold, and labor that is the source of intergroup conflict, not personal characteristics like a prejudiced personality.

Sherif, Sherif, Harvey, and White’s (1961) work at Robber’s Cave was a seminal demonstration of detailed predictions of the theory. In the first, interpersonal phase of their field experiment, a small group of about 25 normal 11-12 year old boys interacted with one another in conditions of normal play. Then, in the second, intragroup group phase of the experiment, the boys were divided into two groups and allowed freedom to organize their activities. Within each group a structure emerged, with some boys becoming leaders, and more central to the social network and decision making of the group than others. Each group developed its own norms for favored activities and places.

In the third, intergroup phase of the experiment, the two groups of boys were brought into contact with one another under competitive conditions involving mutually incompatible goals. The boys were pitted against one another in sporting competitions for prizes, and were brought into situations like a party where there was food enough only for one group, and one group was invited before the other one. One can imagine the feelings of the boys who arrived expecting a party only to find the other group having eaten all the food.

The third phase demonstrated some crucial results for realistic group conflict theory. It was predicted and found that behavioral structures change as a consequence of shifting from interpersonal to group to intergroup contact (phases 1-3). Within group solidarity was at its peak when intergroup hostility was most severe. Friendships formed during the first, interpersonal phase did not survive the second and third phases of the experiment. Interpersonal associations with members of the other group were no longer tolerated under conditions of intergroup conflict. This is reminiscent of what happened during the breakup of the former Yugoslavia, where even strong interpersonal bonds like friendship and marriage were often unable to survive the larger conflict.

Furthermore, the sociometric preferences for boys (e.g., friendship choices) changed between the second and third phases. Tougher, more conflict oriented boys were preferred as leaders for conflict. One boy previously considered a bully became a hero. Another boy, who was a leader during the intragroup phase, lost his status when he refused to come out to confront the rival group of boys during a raid.

These effects showed that group behavior and structure becomes qualitatively different under conditions of involving intergroup conflict compared to an intragroup situation. The entire structure of the group, from friendship to activity preferences changed as a consequence of the demands of the intergroup competition.

In the fourth and final phase of the experiment, it was discovered that only a series of superordinate goals was able to reduce the intergroup conflict. These are goals that require the cooperation of both groups to achieve. Sherif and his colleagues engineered a series of crises that endangered the ability of the camp to continue, such as threatening the camp’s water supply or having supply truck fall into a ditch. They organized the two groups of boys to work together to resolve the crises. For example, boys from the two groups worked together to search for the leak in the water supply, and both groups of were needed to pull the truck out of the ditch.
These superordinate goals had the effect of pulling the two groups together, whereas such strategies as sermons by a priest, negotiations between leaders, and joint social activities were ineffective. Throughout the experiment, it was the structure of the situation that dictated behavior rather than personal preferences. A resolution to conflict was obtained by addressing the conflict situation itself rather than using more interpersonal avenues like improving relationships between the leaders or other group members.

This solution was revolutionary, since the main theories about resolving interethnic conflict at the time were the contact hypothesis (see Allport, 1954) and the aforementioned authoritarian personality theory. In the contact hypothesis, equal status contact, enabling members of different groups to form friendships, is supposed to reduce intergroup tension. The mixed results of the school desegregation program in the United States to improve race relations between blacks and whites (Cook, 1985; Gerard, 1988) showed that in real life, mere increased contact between groups is not enough to break down stereotypes and reduce tension. There is something qualitatively different about intergroup behavior that is more than the sum of individual relationships or personalities.

**Social Identity Theory**

The powerful insights of realistic group conflict theory were elaborated on by social identity theory, which emerged in the 1970’s and became by the 1990’s the most important theory of intergroup relations in psychology. While Sherif demonstrated that mutually incompatible goals are sufficient to create intergroup conflict, Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, and Flament (1971) showed that this was not necessary. In the minimal group paradigm (Brewer, 1979), the only thing necessary to create prejudice and discrimination between groups is a relevant and salient self-categorization, or social identity. Just the awareness of belonging to a group that is different than another group is enough to create prejudice in favor of the in-group against the out-group.

In the minimal group paradigm, people who do not know one another and who are not allowed to interact with one another are brought into a lab. They are classified into two groups invented for the purpose of the experiment, like “dot underestimators and dot overestimators” or “Klee preferers or Kandinsky preferers”. These “minimal groups” are fictional. In fact, membership in the group is randomly assigned, but subjects in the experiment believe they are relevant and valid. This belief alone is sufficient to induce in-group favoritism when assigning rewards to people who are identified only by their group membership. Without any history of prior contact, without any knowledge of any other members of the group, without any meaning of the groups in society, without any knowledge about competence or relative status, subjects in the minimal group paradigm tend to allocate rewards in a way that maximizes the difference between the in-group and the out-group instead of dividing the rewards equally. So a person who believes that he or she is a “dot underestimator” will give more money to another person whom they have never met before, but is identified also as a “dot underestimator” compared to someone who is identified as a “dot overestimator”.

Liu: A Cultural Perspective on Intergroup Relations and Social Identity

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2011
Subsequent research showed that this in-group favoritism effect (Brewer, 1979) applies primarily to rewards, and not punishments (or subtracting resources). That is, in the minimal groups paradigm the subjects favors other in-group members by giving them more rewards, but do not necessarily mean to derogate or punish out-group members (Mummendey et al., 1992).

These startling results gave birth to social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). This theory details the cognitive-motivational bases to intergroup behavior within persons, just as realistic group conflict theory details the structural bases for intergroup behavior surrounding people. According to social identity theory, elaborated in its successor self-categorization theory (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987), each person has a range of self-definitions, some of them group memberships. To the extent that a person identifies with a group (that is, sees the group as a part of himself or herself), they are motivated to evaluate this group positively. Social comparisons where the in-group is evaluated as superior to a relevant out-group are necessary to maintain group-based self-esteem. People favor the in-group over the out-group in the minimal group paradigm in order to establish a social order where the in-group is superior to the out-group.

Of course, in society, there is inequality between groups and it is not possible for every group to make positive social comparisons (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). For instance, in the US it would be difficult for Blacks to make favorable social comparisons for their group on the dimension of wealth. The theory details several ways that group members will react to unfavorable social comparison. If the negative social comparisons are considered to be legitimate and stable, and the boundaries between groups are impermeable, then the person will try social creativity strategies like changing the dimensions of comparison (e.g., they may be richer than us, but we are nicer than them) or who is the comparison group (e.g., we may not be better than other Japanese, but we are better than the Koreans). These strategies make the person feel better without changing the actual conditions of the world. Or, if the boundaries are permeable, then the person will try to “pass” into the advantaged group. This is an individual mobility strategy. The individual tries to become a member of the advantaged group and leave behind his or her original group. In multicultural societies, such a strategy is called assimilation. Only when the negative social comparisons are considered to be both illegitimate and unstable (changeable) will a group engage in overt conflict to try to overturn the existing social order.

Social identity theory is less optimistic than realistic group conflict theory about the prospects for world peace. Realistic group conflict theory implies that if there were enough resources for everyone, there should be no reason for war. But social identity theory implies that the battle is not only for material resources, but for group-based esteem. Moreover, the only way to establish group-based esteem is by comparison to other groups. Social comparisons for intergroup superiority, rather than a struggle for materials resources, are seen as a second major basis for intergroup conflict.

The primary strategy for reducing intergroup conflict according to identity-based approaches is to attempt to change the basis for self-categorization to be more inclusive. Interventions attempt to somehow incorporate out-group members into some level of identification with the self, be it as a superordinate category (e.g., “We are all Asians”) or
as two positively related groups under a superordinate (e.g., blacks and whites think of themselves as Americans while at the same time as acknowledging themselves as ethnically different) (see Gaertner, Dovidio, Anastasio, Bachman, & Rust, 1993).

Cultures and Conflict

The study of intergroup relations in social psychology is centered in experimental or survey-based studies that do not conceptualize their prior history. Not surprisingly, the main attempt by social psychology to intervene in intergroup relations at a societal level (desegregation between blacks and whites in the U.S. based on the contact hypothesis) was not a big success. Cook (1985), in his review of the mixed results of school desegregation, argued that the theoretical conditions required for contact hypothesis to succeed (equal status contact in a supportive environment) were never met, but critics have pointed out that these preconditions were not realistic (Gerard, 1988). The historical experience of African Americans has been different than that of every other ethnic group in the United States. No other group was brought en masse as slaves, and no other group has endured the same degree of prejudice and discrimination against them. It is possible that the contact hypothesis was insufficient to overcome the long history of conflict and the associated power structures that maintain inequality between whites and blacks in the United States.

Because so many societal factors impact on real intergroup conflict between ethnic or national groups, social psychologists have struggled to conceptualize psychological variables that may intervene in these societal level processes. One promising avenue to incorporate societal level processes, and hence culture into the psychological study of intergroup conflict is to study social representations of history (Hilton & Liu, 2008; Liu & Hilton, 2005). Research on the content of popular representations of history across cultures (Liu, 1999; Liu et al., 2005, 2009, 2012) has revealed that intergroup conflict is at the core of how mass publics reconstruct the past.

In a cross-national study involving twelve cultures, Liu et al. (2005) found that World War II was nominated as the most important event in world history, and that Hitler was nominated as the most influential (and negatively perceived) person in the last thousand years. Intergroup conflict constituted between 28-52% ($M = 42\%$) of the total events nominated in the twelve samples, by far the largest category of events. These basic findings were replicated in 12 more societies by Liu et al. (2009), with the major change being that 9-11 (post-2001) replaced events related to the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet block (from data gathered in the 1990s) as the second most important set of conflict related events after the World Wars. In African countries (Cabecinhas et al., in press), colonization and independence (frequently involving warfare) formed a second set of conflict related events after the world wars. So while the specific instances of conflict varied from time to time and from place to place around the anchor of the World Wars, the importance of conflict in the narration of national identities appears to be culture-general (Liu & Laszlo, 2007).
In the specific histories of nations such as Singapore, Malaysia, New Zealand, Philippines, Taiwan, and the Philippines (Huang, Liu, & Chang, 2004; Liu et al., 1999, 2002; Liu & Gastardo-Conaco, 2010), intergroup relations and political events associated with the founding of the state were dominant themes. But the story within which the conflict was configured (see Wertsch, 2002) differed somewhat from society to society. In all 4 societies, colonization was important, but New Zealand's historical narrative was configured as a bicultural relationship between its indigenous people and European settlers, whereas the other stories moved from colonization to national independence.

Hence, if history is a summary of the wisdom and experience of past generations, then it is clear that the main lessons from history concern behavioral tendencies of other groups when it comes to conflict (Liu & Hilton, 2005).

This makes the position of some nations in international relations more difficult than others. Germany must behave more carefully than other nations when sending troops abroad, because their role in World War II during the Nazi period is well-remembered (Liu et al., 2005, 2009). For example, Hilton, Erb, Dermot, and Molian (1996) found that independent of pocketbook variables, the willingness of British and French to enter into the European Union depended on how they perceived the causes of Germany's behavior during the war. If it was due to character flaws rather than situational causes, they were less likely to want to join the EU, presumably because they did not trust the Germans. In general, "collective guilt" is increasingly becoming an important topic in the literature (see Doosje, Branscombe, Spears, Manstead, 1998).

A more general analysis of the role of history in intergroup relations can be achieved by examining the structure and content of societal beliefs.

Social Representations of History: From Hegemonic to Emancipated

Social representations are societal belief structures that link people to larger collectives (Moscovici, 1988). There are three forms of social representations, each relevant for understanding how culture-specific forms of intergroup relations can emerge. Unlike other psychological variables, social representations are content-oriented. In the theory of social representations, content and process are inter-connected. As we shall see, more universal processes of intergroup relations are constrained and put into culture-specific forms through representations.

When social representations are hegemonic, or consensual among all groups, they are treated as though they were a reality. Because there is little variability among hegemonic social representations, they are not useful as individual difference variables. However, they can be used to understand how strong consensus allows societies and peoples to move together as one, and enact culture specific solutions to their problems. When something that is social is treated as though it were a reality, it has the power to create new realities through social policies.

For example, in New Zealand, all groups now consider the Treaty of Waitangi, signed between the British Crown and Maori chieftains in 1840, to be the most important event in New Zealand history (Liu et al., 1999). This gives Maori (indigenous Polynesians,
a 16% minority) a special place in New Zealand society. In terms of size and negative statistics on social indicators, Maori are very similar to blacks in the United States. But unlike in the United States, the civil rights movement to improve the status of Maori has continued. Drawing from the status of the Treaty, the idea that New Zealand should become a bicultural nation has gained momentum. There is a Waitangi Tribunal set up to handle grievances of Maori against the state, and the impact of a bicultural representation of the nation can be seen in such institutions as universities and the national museum (Te Papa). It is reflected in a national psychology where the Maori minority is viewed as symbolically representative of the nation at both the implicit and explicit levels together with the NZ European majority (Sibley & Liu, 2007). Such a pattern is unique among Anglo-settler nations (see for example, Devos & Banaji, 2005 for American data).

But the representational status of the treaty, while important, is less than hegemonic. While an historical representations serve to legitimize the place of a group in society and justify its claims for resources, these claims are frequently contested. A counter-discourse to conceptualizing Maori as having a legitimate historical grievance for a greater share of national resources as a consequence of the injustices of colonization is prevalent. Sibley et al. (2008) describe this pattern as symbolic inclusion but resource-based exclusion or marginalization. Historical negation is an ideology that maintains white material privilege while including Maori as symbolic of the nation: it acknowledges that past injustices occurred, but they belong to the past, and should not affect resource allocations today because this would create a fresh injustice (against the majority). New Zealand's intergroup relations is thus peaceful but contested (Ward & Liu, 2012).

By contrast, when social representations of history are polemical, or in serious disagreement across different groups, they indicate the presence of historically rooted conflict. One group may have an historical grievance against another group, and this may require special treatment to resolve. Polemical representations indicate “fault lines” in society where the relationships between groups may become tense or break.

Devine-Wright's (2001) work on commemorations in Northern Ireland illustrate the manner in which history can function as a polemic in society. Catholics were found to evaluate the Orange parades more negatively than Protestants. Those Protestants who participated in the parades (which commemorate the conquest of Northern Ireland by British Protestants) were more likely to evaluate the parades positively, to oppose change, and to regard history as being a more important foundation of their sense of identity compared to those Protestants who did not to participate.

In Northern Ireland, such a public commemoration of an historical event is used by one group to legitimize their position and to build in-group solidarity in the face of fierce opposition from another group. The conflict between Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland is centuries old. A system of societal beliefs and practices (e.g., an atmosphere of collective fear, emphasis on security and delegimization of the opponent), evolves in such a situation that makes conflict reduction very difficult. A similar case is found in Israel (Bar-Tal, 1999, 2001), where Palestinian and Jewish narratives of history are polemical with one another, narrating contrasting tales of calamitous loss versus the joyful fulfillment of a return to ancestral lands (Hammack, 2011).
The final type of social representation is emancipated. This means that different versions co-exist in different groups of society, but they are either generally not in conflict, or only in conflict under limited circumstances.

The current situation in Taiwan is illustrative of how problems of the past can be connected to current political situations (Huang et al., 2004). Traditionally, Taiwan was a part of China, but Japan took over for about 50 years prior to World War II. After the war, the Kuomintang (KMT) led by Chiang Kai-shek accepted the surrender of the island from Japan, and almost immediately silenced local dissent violently. This event is today consensually recognized as the most important event in Taiwanese history. While all Taiwanese think of February 28th as a tragedy, where one group of Chinese (not native to Taiwan) killed and oppressed another group (native to Taiwan), they differ in how they evaluate Chiang Kai-shek, the author of the tragedy. Native province Chinese evaluate him badly, whereas outside province Chinese (those who arrived as refugees or as soldiers with the KMT, or are children of those immigrants) evaluate him somewhat favorably. For native province Taiwanese, the February 28th incident symbolizes their need for independence and their mistrust of governance by mainland Chinese. This is a big problem because China does not accept Taiwan as a separate nation. Outside province Chinese are less vociferous in their support for Taiwanese independence, and feel more connected to traditional Chinese culture.

It is not as though there is often conflict between native province Chinese and outside province Chinese. Most of the time, they live in harmony, and province of origin is not an issue. But around election time, there are serious differences of opinion between the two groups about the future of the relationship with mainland China. Huang et al. (2004) found that in the 2000 election, the historical evaluation of Chiang Kai-shek was a significant predictor of the vote for President between a native province and outside province candidate, even after controlling for demographic group and social identity. This shows how history is still influential for political decisions today. And it is not just history itself, but its connection to present day politics that makes the representations a powerful influence in societal dynamics.

Social representations of history are considered to moderate the relationship between identities at different levels of inclusiveness (Liu et al., 2002). When the perception of history is consensual or hegemonic across all sub-groups in a society, then it is hypothesized that the relationship between national and subgroup identity (e.g., ethnicity) will be positive; if there are polemics regarding history, then it is hypothesized that the relationship between national and subgroup identity will be negative for the minority group. Emancipated representations are hypothesized to lead to a zero correlation.

In effect, history functions as a resource that can be used to legitimize the position of groups in society (Liu & Hilton, 2005). If all groups agree on the representation of history, then there is no problem. Alternatively, as in New Zealand, one group (Maori) may invoke historical injustices as a reason why they should receive more resources from society; they may criticize the current society as unjust or unfair. If the dominant group is unable to make concessions that satisfy the disadvantaged group, as in Northern Ireland or Israel,
then intergroup conflict is exacerbated. One group may seek to gain their independence from the national group, such as the Palestinian search for a state separate from Israel. In this extreme case, there will be a negative correlation between ethnic identity (Palestinian) and national identity (Israeli).

The struggle for history is an integral part of intergroup polemics. Who did right and who did wrong, who has the right to this land and who does not, what is remembered and what is forgotten, these are issues rooted in history and its representation becomes a resource to position different groups as they try to justify their claims (Paez & Liu, 2011).

Dynamics between Representations, Collective Remembering, Identity, and Politics

The process through which an event enters into history is only now beginning to be understood (Pennebaker, Paez, & Rimé, 1997). There appears to be a critical period between the ages of 15-25 where political events are particularly well remembered by individuals, but whether other generations share this memory depends on whether the event can be connected to current political issues relevant to society. Every 20-30 years a society looks back into the past and engages in the reconstruction of events relevant to its current political interests (Igartua & Paez, 1997). For example, the Spanish Civil War (1936-39) was presented from the perspective of the victors for twenty years, but after General Franco (the victor) died in 1975, there appeared many movies from the perspective of the losers, questioning how the war affected the nation. As Spain was in the process of becoming more democratic after the authoritarian Franco regime, its current politics and identity dictated that it should attempt to reconstruct the past.

Hence, there is a feedback loop between representations of the past and the social identities of the here and now (Liu & Allen, 1999; Liu & Hilton, 2005). As we have argued, social representations of history limit the ability of some groups to make positive social comparisons with others, and facilitate the ability of other groups to make arguments backed by the legitimacy of history. Political groups and leaders are well aware of this, and so immediately after an event occurs the dominant group and leaders in power attempt to present their version of the events as authoritative (Igartua & Paez, 1997; Reicher & Hopkins, 2001). They may attempt to forget an event entirely (or at least seek historical closure, see Hanke et al., 2012), or to present themselves positively. Sometimes, an event is so important as to warrant commemoration (Frijda, 1997; Olick & Robbins, 1998), as it generates a sufficient level of emotion-driven conversations in society as to create a new representation (Rimé, 1997). Such collective remembering is an attempt to establish a consensus about the past, and mark it as a part of present identity.

But not all groups may participate in such commemoration (Devine-Wright, 2001). Over time, the political agenda of the present may change; different groups could become dominant, and then an attempt will be made to reconstruct the past. Representations bear the imprint of these political processes of collective remembering. It will be up to future research to establish the causal links more clearly.
Conclusion

The psychological study of collective remembering and social representations of history has developed significantly over the past decade and a half. Societal belief structures and generational processes appear to be important tools in developing a cultural perspective on intergroup relations in psychology. Universal processes of intergroup relations and social identity are constrained by societal belief structures, which in turn are responsive to the identity and generational processes involved in collective remembering.

At present, it is too early to speculative about whether this approach can bring new solutions to perennial problems of intergroup relations. Most of the work that has been done is more descriptive than prescriptive. But the process of constructing and reconstructing consensus about history appears to be an important tool to locate social psychological research into the specific contexts where they can be most profitably applied.

References


Liu, J. H. & Allen, M. W. (1999). The evolution of political complexity in Maori Hawke's Bay: Archaeological history and its challenge to intergroup theory in psychology. *Group Dynamics: Theory, Research, and Practice, 3*, 64-80. [http://dx.doi.org/10.1037//1089-2699.3.1.64](http://dx.doi.org/10.1037//1089-2699.3.1.64)


About the Author

James Hou-fu Liu is Professor of Psychology at Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand, and Co-Director of its Centre for Applied Cross Cultural Research (http://cacr.victoria.ac.nz). He obtained a Bachelor’s Degree in Computer Science from the University of Illinois and once worked as an aerospace engineer. He then completed a PhD in social psychology at UCLA, followed by a post-doctoral fellowship on dynamical social impact theory at Florida Atlantic University. He has been teaching at Victoria University of Wellington since 1994. His research is in cross-cultural political psychology, specializing in narratives and representations of history and identity. He has more than 130 publications, with edited volumes including New Zealand Identities: Departures and Destinations, Restorative Justice and Practices in New Zealand, Ages Ahead: Promoting intergenerational relationships, and Progress in Asian Social Psychology, Volumes 2 and 6. He was Editor-in-Chief of the Asian Journal of Social Psychology from 2008-2011, and is currently President-Elect of the Asian Association of Social Psychology. A naturalized citizen of two countries, he describes himself as a “Chinese-American-New Zealander”.

Discussion Questions

1. What aspects of intergroup conflict would you consider to be universal and what aspects to be culture specific?

2. How do social representations of knowledge influence the conduct of intergroup relations?

3. Evaluate the ability of social identity theory/self-categorization theory and realistic conflict theory to provide a comprehensive account of intergroup dynamics.

4. Describe some differences in intergroup behaviour between a collective and an individualist group that you know. How can you explain/understand these differences?

5. What do you think are the critical historical events and people in your country? How do these events/people influence the conduct of intergroup relations in your country?

6. How would you go about studying the processes that people use to construct a historical narrative about themselves as a group? e.g., Would you examine school textbooks, national commemorations, family albums, or what?

7. What do historical processes imply about the resolution of intergroup conflict?