Articles, Book Chapters, Essays

Symposium on Diversity and Affirmative Action: Justice and Affirmative Action

John Uglietta — Fri, 28 Sep 2012 07:52:05 PDT

Association Mechanisms and the Intentionality of the Mental

Mark Stephen Pestana — Tue, 25 Sep 2012 12:23:31 PDT

This paper is an explanation of how the intentionality of perception is due to specific associations of sensations. It describes the intentionality of the mental and the problem that intentionality poses for accounts of the mind. The concept of "direction of fit" or "fulfillment of the act" is central to this description. An amalgamation of various recent interpretations of intentionality into a unified theory is presented along with an account of why even such a unified theory fails to account for direction of fit. The direction of fit of perceptual intentionality is then elucidated as a function of patterns of association of sensations. Objections to this associational manner of conceiving of intentionality are responded to and evidence in support of the overall conception is provided. The paper concludes with a brief explanation of how this characterization of direction of fit applies to other domains of mental activity that exhibit intentionality.

Complexity Theory, Quantum Mechanics and Radically Free Self Determination

Mark Stephen Pestana — Tue, 25 Sep 2012 12:23:30 PDT

It has been claimed that quantum mechanics, unlike classical mechanics, allows for free will. In this paper I articulate that claim and explain how a complex physical system possessing fractal-like self similarity could exhibit both self consciousness and self determination. I use complexity theory to show how quantum mechanical indeterminacies at the neural level (as postulated by Eccles and Penrose) could "percolate up" to the levels of scale within the brain at which sensory-motor information transformations occur. Finally, I explain how macro level indeterminacy could be coupled with self determination to provide a physical system with the capacity for radically free willing.

Phenomenotechnique in Historical Perspective: Its Origins and Implications for Philosophy of Science

Teresa Castelao-Lawless — Fri, 21 Sep 2012 11:58:03 PDT

This article provides an overview of the historical and philosophical contexts from which G. Bachelard’s concept of “phenomenotechnique” originated. It shows why phenomenotechnique is crucial for science studies. By incorporating the concept of phenomenotechnique into Hacking’s and Galison’s models of science, I argue that we can avoid the radicalism of both while preventing the analysis of scientific practices from collapsing into the interpretive frames mandated by social constructivists.

Husserl on Intentionality and Intentional Content

Andrew D. Spear — Fri, 21 Sep 2012 11:58:02 PDT

Edmund Husserl (1859—1938) was an influential thinker of the first half of the twentieth century. His philosophy was heavily influenced by the works of Franz Brentano and Bernard Bolzano, and was also influenced in various ways by interaction with contemporaries such as Alexius Meinong, Kasimir Twardowski, and Gottlob Frege. In his own right, Husserl is considered the founder of twentieth century Phenomenology with influence extending to thinkers such as Martin Heidegger, Jean-Paul Sartre, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and to contemporary continental philosophy generally. Husserl’s philosophy is also being discussed in connection with contemporary research in the cognitive sciences, logic, the philosophy of language, and the philosophy of mind, as well as in discussions of collective intentionality. At the center of Husserl’s philosophical investigations is the notion of the intentionality of consciousness and the related notion of intentional content (what Husserl first called ‘act-matter’ and then the intentional ‘noema’). To say that thought is “intentional” is to say that it is of the nature of thought to be directed toward or about objects. To speak of the “intentional content” of a thought is to speak of the mode or way in which a thought is about an object. Different thoughts present objects in different ways (from different perspectives or under different descriptions) and one way of doing justice to this fact is to speak of these thoughts as having different intentional contents. For Husserl, intentionality includes a wide range of phenomena, from perceptions, judgments, and memories to the experience of other conscious subjects as subjects (inter-subjective experience) and aesthetic experience, just to name a few. Given the pervasive role he takes intentionality to play in all thought and experience, Husserl believes that a systematic theory of intentionality has a role to play in clarifying and founding most other areas of philosophical concern, such as the theory of consciousness, the philosophy of language, the philosophy of logic, epistemology, and the philosophies of action and value. This article presents the key elements of Husserl’s understanding of intentionality and intentional content, specifically as these are developed in his works Logical Investigations and Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy.