5-1997

Making Educational Reform: Hard Times in Detroit 1988-1995

Richard C. Hula
Michigan State University

Richard W. Jelier
Grand Valley State University, jelierr@gvsu.edu

Mark Schauer
Michigan State University

MAKING EDUCATIONAL REFORM
Hard Times in Detroit 1988-1995

RICHARD C. HULA
Michigan State University
RICHARD W. JELIER
Grand Valley State University
MARK SCHAUER
Michigan State University

This article examines education reform in Detroit, employing data from over 75 semistructured elite interviews. The research explores the apparent collapse of a local education reform effort in Detroit despite broad dissatisfaction with the current education system. Both collaborative and competitive approaches to reform are investigated through a regime framework. Reformers who implemented change were removed from office and yet a business school compact, neighborhood-based empowerment schools, and schools of choice remain as a legacy. This indicates that although short-term political support for change in Detroit did collapse, some long-term institutional impact of the reform remains.

> One of the problems Detroit has, in my view, is it has a very dysfunctional civic infrastructure, very dysfunctional. . . . People don't know how to talk with one another is the basis of the problem, but the civic language of Detroit is a language of the old style of labor negotiations. I mean, in your face, side deals, don't trust anybody, you know, what can I get for myself, and the only way I can get it for myself is by pushing somebody else down—very, very win-lose, very dysfunctional culture.
>
> Detroit business leader

AUTHORS' NOTE: *An earlier version of this article was presented at the 1995 meeting of the Urban Affairs Association, April 3-6, Portland, Oregon. The data reported in the article were collected as part of a National Science Foundation sponsored project, "Civic Capacity and Urban Education." This project is studying education reform in 11 major cities in the United States.*

URBAN EDUCATION, Vol. 32 No. 2, May 1997 202-232

This article explores the paradox presented by the repeated collapse of local education reform efforts despite broad dissatisfaction with the current education system. Low achievement scores, high dropout rates, and even a lack of physical safety for children are routinely cited as indicators of failed education policy. Politicians, educators, business leaders, and parents all seek alternative strategies to improve the quality of education targeted to inner-city youth. Despite an impressive array of concerned advocates and a strong case for change, education reform is far from assured. Many past waves of reform have had a limited impact (Cuban, 1990; Elmore, 1990; Goodland, 1984; Katz, 1987; Powell, Farrar, & Cohen, 1985; Sarason, 1982). Indeed, some argue that the entire system of public education needs to be fundamentally restructured if there is to be any significant improvement (Chubb & Moe, 1990; Lieberman, 1993). Sarason (1990) has characterized city school systems as too large, bureaucratic, and unable to engage in change from within. Others who support the general framework of public education still demand fundamental change (Henig, 1994). Nevertheless, specific reform efforts often quickly gather support and then almost as quickly dissipate.

Detroit would seem to provide a particularly dramatic example of failed education reform. In 1988, the city's school system seemed poised on the brink of comprehensive change. Four new school board members (popularly referred to as the HOPE team) were elected in 1988 and quickly established a working majority based on election pledges to restructure the city's school system.[1] The new board sought to impose its vision by removing the long-standing superintendent and hiring a nationally prominent reformer. By 1992, however, the most visible signs of this effort had disappeared. Three of the original four reform members of the school board failed to be reelected. Other board supporters quickly refocused their energies. By 1994, the new superintendent was replaced by a longtime Detroit insider, symbolically closing the reform era.

A closer review of the reform effort in Detroit reveals that policy outcomes are much too complex to be characterized as simply a success or a failure. To be sure, almost all the major reform leaders were defeated and the emphasis placed on their agenda by local

education leaders was largely withdrawn. However, major innovations created by the reformers remain, including public-private collaboration in a school compact, a set of decentralized neighborhood-based empowerment schools, and a variety of special targeted programs. Thus the long-term institutional impact of the reform effort is unclear. What is clear, however, is that short-term political support for rapid radical change in Detroit has collapsed.

The clear failure of the reform leadership in Detroit must be seen as a political rather than an educational failure. To be sure, educational success will ultimately need to be assessed at the level of the student. However, if there is to be a measurable impact at the classroom level, reforms will need to generate some minimum degree of political support that permit their implementation. It is this political process we seek to examine and understand.

METHODS

The analysis reported in this article is based on extensive field research conducted in the city of Detroit over a 2-year period (March 1993 to June 1995). The primary data source is a set of face-to-face comprehensive semistructured interviews conducted with over 75 local respondents. Interviews were conducted with representatives from three broad citizen categories: general influentials, program specialists, and community advocates. General influentials interviewed include 8 in business and banking, 3 union representatives, 2 officials in State of Michigan departments, 4 in city departments, 6 university liaisons, 3 representatives of the Detroit press, 2 city council members, and 1 county agency worker. Program specialists include 9 Detroit Public School (DPS) program specialists, 3 DPS superintendents, 8 DPS school board members, 3 representatives from teachers and administrative unions, and 2 representatives from Detroit's alternative schools. Community advocates include representatives from 10 nonprofit organizations, 7 Detroit civic associations, 4 churches, 7 foundations, and 2 parent organizations.

Obviously, no claim of statistical representativeness can be made for this sample. However, in response to traditional concerns about the external validity of such elite studies, Yin correctly points out that the aim of a case study is to expand and generalize theory (Yin, 1993, p. 10). Yin terms this *analytic generalization*, and contrasts it with the "statistical generalization" used in surveys (p. 36). He asserts that the "analogy to samples and universes is incorrect when dealing with case studies" (p. 36). The task of the qualitative researcher is one of analysis and synthesis. Synthesis requires fitting the pieces together into a meaningful matrix.

LEADERSHIP AND POLICY CHANGE

Over the past two decades, a significant literature in urban politics has focused on how local leaders mobilize community resources to implement policy preferences. A large number of careful case studies make it clear that although successful leaders use a wide variety of strategies, some commonalities exist (Judd & Parkinson, 1990; Stone, 1989; Stone & Sanders, 1987). The most important is the linking of public and private resources to some common goal. As Stone (1989) argues, an electoral coalition is seldom sufficient to actually govern. Rather, political leaders must create a more inclusive regime that includes "the informal arrangements that surround and complement the formal workings of governmental authority" (p 3). From this perspective the key to understanding successful policy implementation is the process by which public actors create viable coalitions around substantive issues.

A good deal of empirical evidence has been amassed over the past decade showing that in many American cities, such political coalitions have been forged around economic development. Such progrowth efforts have typically targeted physical redevelopment of downtown centers, sometimes with spectacular results. Cities such as Baltimore and Pittsburgh have seen much of their downtown rebuilt during the last decade. This revitalization was aided by public funds, but was fueled primarily by private investment. Although actors from the private sector were without question often motivated by a public spirit for their community, in the end the

strongest motivation to participate in renewal programs was economic return (Fainstein, Fainstein, Hill, Judd, & Smith, 1986; Judd & Parkinson, 1990; Stone & Sanders, 1987).[2]

The importance of economic notables in local political regimes is hardly in dispute. Descriptive studies of central city renewal show that economic leaders are critical in the creation of effective governing coalitions. Local leaders who were able to secure the support and cooperation of local business leaders were successful in spurring public and private investment in their cities. Where such cooperation was not obtained, results were problematic. Open conflict with economic elites often threatened the viability of the electoral coalition. For example, the collapse of the Kucinich administration in Cleveland can clearly be traced to fundamental disputes with the business community. Similar conflicts existed in New York. Even Harold Washington, who attempted to form a progressive regime in Chicago based on support of neighborhood and minority voters, felt obliged to form working coalitions with the city's economic notables. The key role of economic notables is not surprising. Indeed, it could hardly be otherwise, given the distribution of authority and resources in the United States. The more interesting (and controversial) question is whether local authorities have the capacity to respond to political demands that contradict the perceived interests of economic elites.

This emphasis on local regime forces a reconceptualization as to how we examine the policy process. In stressing the interconnectiveness of elements of the local polity, regime theory demands that scholars and practitioners consider a wide variety of potential actors. It rejects the traditional view of political power as an exercise in hierarchical control and replaces it with a capacity to coordinate and motivate private and public actors. The implications of this reconceptualization are profound. For example, traditional efficiency measures for program evaluation are likely inadequate, or even misleading. Emphasis must be placed not simply on the delivery of a concrete good or service, but in creating the political capacity to produce a desired outcome. In this sense, the goal of policy implementation is a process of social learning as well as service production (Elkin, 1987; Stone, 1987).

Although it is by no means certain that a successful local coalition around education issues can be formed, the history of local economic development efforts do seem to offer a potential path to systemic reform. The case of Detroit, however, suggests that this path may be a difficult one for public authorities, in light of the complex interplay among actors and shifting regime leadership.

EDUCATIONAL INNOVATION IN DETROIT: 1988-1995

The HOPE school board coalition in Detroit quickly began to translate its 1988 electoral victory into policy change. The reformers focused primarily on three principal venues of policy innovation. Variations in the structure and support across these venues provide important clues in explaining differences in sustainability of specific reforms. The most durable reform, a public-private collaboration, rests on a foundation of a partnership between school and other community actors. Local site empowerment and specialized schools of choice, the other major reform efforts, are internal restructuring efforts. Although similar internal strategies have been engaged in other cities, there are few examples where they were so rapidly sought, then so quickly abandoned as in Detroit.

PUBLIC-PRIVATE COLLABORATION: THE DETROIT COMPACT

Formed in 1988, the Detroit Compact has become a cornerstone of school reform in the city. The compact grew out of the recommendations of the Detroit Strategic Planning Initiative, financed by a powerful private foundation in the city, Detroit Renaissance. It has had strong support both within the city and at the state level. The Michigan Department of Commerce provided $500,000 in seed money to the compact. The election of a reform-minded school board in 1988 greatly facilitated efforts to solicit additional business support for the compact.

The compact guarantees students either 4-year tuition scholarships at Michigan's public universities or interviews for career-track jobs if they maintain minimum grade requirements, test, and

attendance standards. The compact also provides students with summer job opportunities, tutoring, and many other resources. Initially, compact operations were directed by a council composed of 12 stakeholder groups: community, business, higher education, State of Michigan, City of Detroit, organized labor, Board of Education, DPS superintendent, Detroit Federation of Teachers (DFT), the Organization of School Administrators and Supervisors, and parents and students. In 1995, two additional stakeholder groups were added. Wayne County became the thirteenth member and a coalition of private colleges and universities became the fourteenth. Each participating school has a Local Compact Council (LCC) that meets monthly and is a miniversion of the systemwide compact. The LCC has a representative from each patron group and, along with the school principal, oversees the compact budget and coordination. There is no set compact program. Each school is provided with the flexibility and capacity to adjust the partnership to best suit local school needs. To become a compact school, the partnership requires a commitment from the principal, two thirds of the faculty (including union representatives), and 50% of the students.

A number of observers claim that the LCCs have been successful in engaging community actors long absent from local education. The monthly LCC meetings and the bimonthly stakeholder meetings provide a vehicle where community input is accepted and conflict by stakeholders can be resolved. This process is well described by a representative from the Chamber of Commerce:

> The schools really were a closed community. What is happening now and again, I think, because of the compact, the schools are becoming more open communities. For example, in each compact school there is a council that replicates the major stakeholders group so that the schools now have business people and community people and union people and higher education people who visit the school regularly, who work with the schools. I think the schools are realizing that their success in the future really lies with being an open community, taking advantage not only of the resources that they want, but also of the expertise and the volunteers that really are required to get involved in education. So, yes I do think there's a significant shift going on there.

According to an official in the Michigan Department of Commerce, no other public-private collaborations in education across the country involve as many stakeholders as the multilevel Detroit Compact. Certainly the marshaling of community intellectual and financial resources has been impressive. Over 1,000 volunteers have served as tutors and mentors in the schools each year. A full-time compact director is employed in each building to establish strong community relations and to work to find jobs for students. More than 100 students are currently attending college with compact support. The Detroit Compact has raised over six million of a ten-million dollar endowment for college scholarships. The Coalition of African Americans for Education was formed to ensure that at least one million of the ten million dollars would be raised by the African American community. In 1994, the compact expanded to include 33 schools, nearly one half of all the city's public middle and high schools.

Infrastructure improvements have become an increasingly important element of the compact program. For example, Mumford High in Detroit opened a $725,000 high technology laboratory, with 20 Apple and 20 IBM computers. Michigan Bell and Ameritech donated $400,000 for the project and the Detroit Compact funded another $105,000 (*Detroit Free Press* 22 May 1991, 3B). Without the help of the business community, the DPS never even could have considered such facilities. McKenzie High School's compact partner, IBM, followed suit and donated more than $500,000 in equipment, software, and technical services for the McKenzie/IBM Science Technology Wing. The new wing includes seven classrooms and three presentation rooms. IBM also trained school employees to use this technology.

In the time since its inception in the 1989-1990 academic year through the 1993-1994 academic year, the compact has provided 4,216 jobs to on-target compact students and 214 college tuition awards. A survey conducted by the Greater Detroit Alliance of Business revealed that 93% of employers who hired an on-target compact student would so again. Preliminary results indicate that the compact is making a positive difference in many of the city schools. The longer a school participates in the compact, the better

the performance at that school. The four schools with the highest rates of on-target twelfth graders are those that have been in the compact for 3 or more years. According to a Chamber official, the compact has already realized an important educational reform by creating easily measured outcome standards.

State level support for the compact also has continued to grow. Virtually every state department is now involved, including Education, Commerce, Social Services, Mental Health, Civil Service, Transportation, and the State Housing Development Authority. Not only do members from these departments sit in at all the LCCs, but some have adopted schools, provided surplus equipment, expertise, data analysis, and significant volunteer time. The total monetary value of these contributions may actually exceed the annual appropriations to the partnership from the state legislature. In addition, the Departments of Social Services and Mental Health recently began to provide some state services at school sites. It is significant that the Department of Commerce and not the Department of Education has been the major facilitator in the partnership. This emphasizes how local economic development strategies have become closely identified with education policy. This link is based on the argument that human capital needs must be met if the state is to be competitive in a global marketplace.

The success and stability of the compact does, however, have important political limits. These limits were dramatically revealed during the 1992 school board elections and the 1995 school bond election. In both cases, efforts were made to use the public support for the compact to influence public opinion on other education policy issues. In 1992, this effort was very direct. In an effort to promote education reform, the Detroit Chamber of Commerce explicitly threatened to reconsider its long-term commitment to the compact if board incumbents were not returned to office. Three of the four HOPE incumbents were in fact turned out of office. The general impression is that the efforts of the Chamber were not at all helpful to the candidates they supported. A similar outcome occurred in 1995, when business leaders opposed a $1.5 billion facilities bond issue proposed by the school board. In the bond campaign, support for the compact was not directly raised. This

more-tempered opposition, however, proved no more effective, and the bond issue was passed by a large majority.

INTERNAL REFORM I: SCHOOL EMPOWERMENT

Public institutions have been subject to intense scrutiny over the past decade. There is a growing consensus that highly centralized bureaucratic organizations are inefficient and often unresponsive to social needs. In most urban school districts, critics see problems associated with all large-scale organizations, including strong incentives to maximize budgets, workforce, and policy control. Although little unanimity exists on how to restructure, there is a growing consensus that current programs should be more decentralized, structured around local-initiated strategies where participants are in the best position to effectively identify those needs and respond with specific goals.[3] Movement toward local discretion and site-based management are seen as ways to generate greater accountability and empowerment.

The HOPE-dominated school board planned to implement widespread decentralization. Indeed, it was championed by the HOPE team as the primary reform vehicle for the district. Schools granted site-management authority were to be designated as empowerment schools if the principal, 75% of teachers, and 50% of support staff voted for empowerment. Each of the empowered schools were given wide discretion over how funds were to be spent. The empowerment schools were to be governed by a School Empowerment Council/Team whose members were charged to define and implement an educational agenda for the school.[4] The HOPE board had hoped to make every school in the district an empowered school. In all, 26 schools became formally empowered and a number of other schools adopted some form of shared decision-making government structure.

Respondents claimed empowerment got off to a promising beginning. Although the pace of implementation was slow, a number of observers saw an emerging consensus supporting empowerment. Problems began when HOPE members grew impatient with the pace of reform. A former superintendent states:

> I would say that my position on empowerment was, you can't push that. That's something that's got to germinate on its own. We had about 21 schools as part of that initiative when I left. They tried to push it contractually. My response to you is that I didn't think there was anything wrong with the way we started empowerment. It's just that it wasn't something you could push on people. . . . In many public meetings I told them, I said, "look, you don't understand." I said, "if you put the unions up against the wall, you're gonna lose." I said, "we created a very delicate, successful balance here and it's something that has to be cultivated and it can't be something you can force." They didn't listen.

The school board moved quickly to implement the empowered school concept, trying to force some of the changes contractually on the union. A Wayne State University respondent contended, "changes were occurring too quickly without the membership . . . if you want to use the word . . . you know . . . the union." A former board member illustrated the union's ability to play both sides of the issue:

> I also find it's kind of interesting, just a couple weeks ago there was an item in *The Detroit News*. There was a Harvard study going back and evaluating the aftermath of desegregation litigation in Detroit. It might have been interesting for you to note, that the Harvard folks were charging that the Detroit Schools were performing abysmally and John Elliot is quoted in there, in the back, and he said, "well, they're not all performing abysmally," says John Elliot. The schools of choice, empowered schools, are really showing progress, words to that effect. For the person who killed the blueprint, I find that quite ironic to have him make the statement.

By the end of the 1991-1992 school year, nearly all of the DPS's unions went on record against empowerment, stressing concerns over job security, privatization of some school services, and transfer of staff. Many community members opposed because they were not given much information on empowered schools and feared they would be elitist. A 4-week strike at the beginning of the 1992-1993 school year further widened the gulf between the unions and administrative leadership. Expansion of self-governing schools was put on hold in the 1993-1994 school year as the $1.3 million slated for the creation of new empowered schools was used to

balance the 1993-1994 budget. Although representatives of the school district continue to express formal support for the concept of site-based management, the term *empowerment* has virtually disappeared from official DPS rhetoric. Only one additional school voted for empowerment during the first year and a half of the current, post-HOPE superintendent's tenure. The Office of Empowerment, Diversity, and Choice was renamed the Office of Research, Development, and Coordination.

Leadership at some empowered schools remain enthusiastic supporters of the reform. A principal of one of the 26 empowered schools claims she has been overwhelmed by the kind of interest and participation in the school.

> I've tried innovation in other schools. Sometimes it was very difficult to get 10 people to come to a school meeting. I think some of that has to be our responsibility, to break down some of those old walls and make it a place where people aren't intimidated to come and feel very welcome when they get here and know that their presence is not just a token.

A key frustration for district administrators is the failure of many empowered schools to accept the goal of shared decision making. Some empowered schools have emphasized union rights rather than reworking the school governance and academic program. Some schools that are empowered are described as only wanting control over the money but did not really want to change. A DPS administrator stated:

> So we have these schools, a few of them, not many, that are not intent on really implementing any change. That's my frustration. We don't have the staff to really follow up all the time. Six months later, we find out the principal has not convened an empowerment council meeting. If the parents don't complain, it may not come to our attention. In conversation with a non-complying principal, I really got frustrated. The next week I find out the principal has spent money without involving the stakeholders, "but you just told me you didn't spend any money." "Well, I needed the books in order to operate my curriculum." "Yes, but if you become empowered, you cannot make decisions about money without involving the council." "Yes, but it is my curriculum and I needed to . . . ." For a few principals, personally, they just want the control over the money.

Even worse, a few months after this discussion, a principal of an empowered school was charged with embezzling over $140,000 in funds (*Detroit Free Press*, 21 August 1994, 3B). Reinforcing the perils of implementation, a school administrator stated:

> This office has only been in existence for a year and it started a year ago in August, and when I am naive, I can be real naive. I just assumed that folks were doing things that they said they were doing. Some weren't doing. Now the two new schools that are becoming empowered, the 25th and 26th, have already written on to the empowerment contract. I will make sure they won't get a dime until I am sure that there is compliance. I've been burned, now I want to come out and talk to the group. So you learn.

INTERNAL REFORM II: DIVERSITY AND CHOICE

The HOPE board also sought to create specialized schools of choice. Such schools offer parents a range of alternatives for their children. The value of this choice rests on the assumptions that parents will choose programs that best serve their children's needs. Schools that are successful will thrive, those that are not will fail. Increasing school options for parents was the primary reform advocated by Superintendent McGriff, who was hired by the HOPE board reformers. The DPS expanded three principal types of specialized schools: Comer school development program, African-centered academies, and professional development schools. In addition, the number of theme schools grew, focusing on mathematics, science and technology, foreign language, multiculturalism, examination schools, business education, allied health, and fine and performing arts.

A number of observers claim that expanding parental choice has been a benefit to children in the DPS. An area superintendent for DPS sees the variety of schools and programs as providing a better match to the complex needs of Detroit's children. A similar theme was struck by a Detroit minister who stated, "the diversity is good; while trying to meet the kid's needs, rather than trying to have one box of cereal for everybody, let's get the 12-pack."

Schools of choice are not neighborhood schools, although most choice schools give first priority to neighborhood residents. A few

schools, such as Cass Tech and Renaissance High, were created as citywide institutions. Others have adopted specific themes and used excess capacity to recruit students from across the city. Critical to this process are efforts to ensure that parents have sufficient information to make an appropriate choice:

> We need to get our parents more involved, we need to have parent resource centers. We need to make sure that the processes for new initiatives is fair and equitable. Because all we need is one incident and it can blow great ideas and months of planning right out of the water. This year we had our third choice fair. Our first one we had about 800 parents, our second one we had 2,000, this year we had 6,000 parents. I know next year we won't be able to handle, it will be so big. People can't make good choices if they don't have any information. So at our choice fair, every one of our choice options is represented. And they have a booth. Parents walk around and ask questions of staff and that is just great.

Several specific models were advanced within the general framework of diversity and choice schools.

The Comer school development program. In 1993, the Skillman Foundation began discussions with the DPS to explore possible implementation of the Comer school development program in a set of Detroit schools. A specific effort was made to engage a wide range of actors in the school system, including those at the superintendent level, area offices, and local school representatives. The goal was to build a coalition able to generate broad support for the program. It was decided that 18 schools spread across the city would be involved in the Skillman project. The need for long-term political support for the project was made explicit by a representative of the foundation:

> We're involved in the process of change and if it's not difficult and arduous, you're not doing any significant reform, so we expect some problems, that there will be some obstacles, there are going to be difficulties.

This was also acknowledged by actors with the DPS:

> Many of the projects that are funded by private organizations exist outside of the normal working culture and structure of the schools. I think these projects are important and it's our intention to move

> the school development program into a very central position within the district but we're not there yet. The Chamber [of Commerce] on the other hand has demonstrated by making long and substantial commitments to the compact that outside groups can in fact take a major role in defining education issues in the district. But it doesn't happen overnight.

Although Skillman Foundation trustees did express concern about leadership stability in DPS when the HOPE board collapsed, they approved sufficient funding for the project to begin in six schools. Each of the selected targets are elementary neighborhood schools, with no prior comprehensible improvement strategy in place. The total estimated budget for the project calls for Skillman to contribute approximately $16 million over a 10-year period. Both the district and Eastern Michigan University committed significant in-kind contributions. The total DPS commitment is valued at a million dollars. Eastern Michigan will contribute approximately $100,000. Foundations have a reputation for looking at a problem and working on it for a relatively small period of time and then turning their attention to something else. In contrast, Skillman's trustees have been persuaded that education should be a fundamental focus of the foundation.

The professional development schools. Three professional development schools were established as part of the Michigan Partnership for New Education. Once schools are selected, they receive technical training and support from a number of Michigan universities through the Michigan Partnership. Most of the professional development schools across the state have only had one university partner, although some have as many as six. Professional development schools often serve as an urban school laboratory for the university and provide a site for student teachers to receive their first classroom experience.

African-centered academies. Seven African-centered academies grew out of a proposal to establish a set of all-male academies. Ultimately, the state courts ruled that all-male public schools were unconstitutional, and the schools were forced to admit a certain percentage of girls. Although each school has its own mission state-

ment, all stress African-centered education. Instruction begins from the assumption that African American people have played key roles in the development of civilization throughout time. As one respondent noted:

> It allows African American children, particularly, to have a better view of themselves and that is essential when people can have self-esteem that is positive, it allows them to approach education differently. It allows them to socialize differently, etc. So from that standpoint, I think the African-centered schools have done and are continuing to do a good job in that perspective.

Several community organizations, such as Operation Get Down, SoSad, the Shriners, the Nation of Islam, the NAACP, and the Urban League were active in promoting the academies. In contrast, the DFT opposed several key elements of the plan, particularly the all-year school calendar at Malcolm X Academy.

A principal to one of the African-centered academies spoke to the timing of the reform initiatives and the political obstacles.

> Well, I think there are always and will continue to be political obstacles because the various segments of the community from time to time have different political agendas. I would not have been able to, in my estimation, put through this concept with the political operatives that we have today on the board. As it were, the political operatives at that time were of the visionary mind set to do the kinds of things that need to be done. So clearly there'll always be certain political obstacles. There always will be certain internal obstacles and bureaucracy. The difficulty of pulling together coalitions of commitment, getting people's awareness to the point that they understand what you're doing, those kinds of things.

THE NEAR END OF REFORM: 1995

It is hardly surprising that the dramatic reforms proposed by the HOPE board would generate substantial controversy. Even Deborah McGriff, the board's superintendent recognized this: "In the past, nothing happened and people were very, very safe. They believed innovations come and go. They might outlive me, but while I'm superintendent, I'm going to promote programs I know work and that I believe in" (*Detroit News*, 22 June 1992, 1). Her prophesy

would be realized as public resistance all but destroyed the reform coalition that had brought her to Detroit. The school board elected in 1992 eventually provoked her resignation. The new board of education began and then canceled a national search, hiring instead, a school system insider to a long-term contract. Both the board and its current superintendent appear more focused on facility conditions and student safety, rather than continuing innovative approaches to bring comprehensive change to the system. A former board member commented:

> You win the battle but lose the war and lose your organization and lose everything you're fighting for. The HOPE team had not learned that lesson and we all pleaded with them to slow down. It's not what they wanted to do. It was how they did things, not the mission, where the reform group split up on the board. Some of us who consider ourselves deep, passionate reformers could not go along with how things were being done. Because they were in power on the board as president and vice president and chair of the finance committee and chair of the most important committees, they were able to run the board in a way that even left out their own allies.

The HOPE coalition provides dramatic evidence that electoral office does not necessary permit one to dictate or impose change on a community. A DPS administrator stated:

> It is necessary to have buy in from the community every step of the way. It takes longer to do that. It probably takes five times as long. You have to be skilled in knowing when to move forward. That is a mixed bag. In the past we were heavily criticized as moving too slowly. Clearly Dr. McGriff was criticized in some circles for moving too rapidly. So it is a skill, but it is necessary to build support along the way and take some risks.

The critical analytical question about this case is whether the failure of the HOPE reforms is simply a tale of personal incompetence or whether there were other systemic forces at work.

CONSTRAINTS TO EDUCATION INNOVATION IN DETROIT

Education reform in Detroit takes place in the context of political instability and sustained elite conflict. Key elements of this conflict

occur both at the regional and city level. At the regional level, education politics is driven by factors of race and distribution of economic resources. Detroit is a poor, African American core city surrounded by a relatively affluent and White suburban ring. Efforts of the region's economic elite to engage the city's educational system are sometimes seen as an invasion of the city by a White economic elite. In Detroit, there is a strong sense of local ownership of the school district that can make it difficult to forge coalitions outside the city. Within the city, coalitions supporting school reform are also fragile, often having a very limited institutional base. The city's limited capacity to support reform can be described at three levels. The first is based on a review of the narrow set of actors engaged in the reform effort. A second level is structural constraints on the creation of a more broad-based coalition that might support reform. Finally, the importance of a Detroit civic culture for understanding the collapse of educational reform in Detroit is examined.

ACTORS

The literature on central city redevelopment makes it clear that city leaders used a variety of strategies to create a viable political coalition with sufficient capacity to implement downtown renewal (Judd & Kantor, 1992; Stone, 1989). Although the path used to reach this outcome varied, the resulting coalitions were quite similar. Two features seem particularly relevant here. First is the importance of the business community. Successful urban leaders were able to enlist the support of a significant portion of local economic elites for the redevelopment plans. A second feature is the breadth of support across various actors in the community. Key is the collaboration between the formal institutions of government and others actors in the private sector.

Historically, the DPS system has been dominated by a narrow professional elite composed of education insiders—professionals (superintendent and top administrators), educators' unions, and the elected board of education. Community leaders describe the DPS bureaucracy as highly insular and resistant to change. In 1971, as a result of state legislation, DPS decentralized into eight districts. However, in 1981, city voters approved a referendum to recentral-

ize administration by eliminating area school boards and scaling back the authority of area superintendents. The referendum consolidated power within the office of the general superintendent. Until recent years, the office of the general superintendent has been held by a district insider. Arthur Jefferson, the district's first African American superintendent, served from 1974 to 1988. The election of the HOPE team introduced a period of extended discontinuity and instability (three superintendents since 1989). John Porter served on an interim basis from 1989 to 1991. Deborah McGriff, hired in 1991, carried the banner of reform until her demise in 1993. Both were recruited from outside the district. McGriff's successor and current superintendent, David Snead, represents a return to a longtime district insider.

The board of education has demonstrated an ability to formulate reform policies, but only a limited capacity to actually implement such efforts. This has been the case since 1988, when the HOPE team, solidly backed by the White suburban business community and opposed in the election by then-Mayor Coleman Young, swept into power and solidified a reform majority on the school board. Innovation was short lived, however, as reformers were met with stiff opposition from an entrenched labor community, peaking with a monthlong, bitterly contentious teachers' strike in the months prior to the November 1992 school board election. The board of education has proven to be a stage for larger political regime conflict, with polarized electoral conflicts and shifting governing coalitions. With the erosion of the HOPE coalition in 1992-1993, a mood of reform backlash predominated, resulting in favor of clean, safe, and healthy neighborhood schools versus pilot approaches for specialized schools. The appointment of Snead as superintendent signaled a return to business as usual.

The DFT and related school unions were widely acknowledged as presenting the greatest institutional barrier to school reform. Several interviewees remarked that DPS is owned by the unions. A Detroit church leader stated:

> I think that probably the strongest influence on the Detroit Public Schools system is the teachers' union, and what that says is that it's the self-interest of the teachers that gets first attention. Compensation and work rules and hours of work and all those factors and

> supervision and evaluation, all of that is set by the very people who are mostly affected by it, not by people who are on the outside asking what they're getting for that. . . . I'd say, even up until this last election [1992], they've demonstrated clearly that they're in charge. The system is in the hands of the professionals, the unions.

During the 1992 teachers' strike and subsequent HOPE reelection campaign, the DFT successfully rallied the Detroit labor community (the UAW and the AFL-CIO), along with sympathetic, antireform grassroots organizations, to kill the empowerment movement and cripple the HOPE reformers. A telling account of the unions' entrenchment in Detroit was offered by a former HOPE team school board member in which he related how the DFT reversed itself by rejecting a *Memorandum of Understanding: Empowerment and School of Choice*, authored by the American Federation of Teachers and originally endorsed by the DFT.[5] Similarly, the Organization of Supervisors and Administrative Staff rejected a proposal expanding the work year, salary, and authority of building principals as being against the best interest of its members and without presenting the proposal to its members. Many claim the unions were destined to strike in reaction to HOPE reforms. In sharp contrast, current superintendent Snead was able to achieve labor peace early in his tenure. Snead's capacity to reach an early contract with the union was greatly enhanced by a short-term financial windfall generated by school finance restructuring, passed by referendum by Michigan voters in 1993.

A strong, politically active, grassroots network of education support organizations does exist in Detroit. Local, areawide, and citywide school community organizations provide a vehicle for direct interaction with individual schools and school administration. These groups help comprise the millage armies, historically instrumental in winning property tax renewals and increases for Detroit schools, including the November 1994 $1.5 billion bond initiative for school facilities that faced the intense opposition of newspaper editorial boards and the Greater Detroit Chamber of Commerce. It is interesting to note that these grassroots groups, including gadfly groupies that regularly lend an element of theater to board of education meetings, were not mobilized to support education reform. In fact, they opposed the HOPE candidates in their 1992

reelection bid. Although individual parent groups exist in support of empowerment schools, grassroots groups appear to oppose innovative proposals, instead favoring back-to-basic approaches.

The opposition of many community organizations to the HOPE agenda developed even though these groups were often very critical of the performance of Detroit's public schools. The HOPE reforms were seen as elitist, focusing on a limited number of targeted schools. The result was seen as even fewer resources for neighborhood schools. The reformers reintroduced a bitter controversy regarding neighborhood schools versus specialized schools, which had first erupted under Superintendent Jefferson when he established a set of magnet academies and examination schools. A community advocate expressed her disdain for the magnet schools:

> The way they became examination schools was they just threw everybody out that didn't meet their criteria. I don't know how much more elitist you can get than that. There are still attempts by the elitists within the district to isolate the "really good kids" from the other kids.

Two other actors in the education arena are the business community and the mainstream press. Both became supporters and advocates of the HOPE reform agenda. As a result, each currently finds itself largely on the outside looking in, at odds with the back-to-basics agenda of Superintendent Snead and the DPS. In the contentious campaign over the $1.5 billion capital bond referendum (on the heels of statewide elimination of property tax funding for schools), both mainstream newspapers (the *Detroit News* and *Detroit Free Press*) and the Greater Detroit Chamber of Commerce (surrogate for the predominantly White, medium-sized suburban businesses) came under intense fire for their brand of plantation politics in opposing the referendum. The board referendum campaign reveals increasing polarity between regional economic elites and grassroots community groups.

Detroit churches are perhaps the most important community-level organizations in the city. Churches and their leaders are often principal actors in community decision making and coalition formation. Churches frequently function as areas for political debate and election campaigns. Political actors in all sectors of the city

take care to seek advice and support from senior church leaders. This is true for city government, the board of education, and the general superintendent. Church leaders were very supportive of the HOPE team in the 1988 elections, often providing a forum for the candidates to present their views. However, most grew disillusioned with the perceived exclusionary tactics of the HOPE team. The political importance of local churches was revealed in the remark by a HOPE coalition member that they knew that their reelection bids would not be successful when the ministers refused to allow their churches to be used as forums in the 1992 elections.

Conspicuously absent in the school reform effort is the mayor and other key actors in city government. Publicly, Mayor Coleman Young stayed clear of school operations. He did, however, attempt to influence school board elections, supporting his political cronies over HOPE school board candidates. Young also was reported to have a good deal of covert influence over the agenda and votes of the board of education. According to a Young aide:

> Right now, while I'm in the Mayor's office, there are at least five votes on the Detroit Board of Education that I can count on because we helped their campaigns. I'd call the chairman and the superintendent of the schools and have the issue placed on the agenda, and we'd get the votes to get it through.

Young's positions were in line with preserving the status quo and protecting his grassroots political base, as evidenced by opposition to recentralizing school administration and opposition to the 1988 HOPE school board slate. Dennis Archer, elected mayor in November 1993 as an inclusive coalition builder, has promised to "weigh in with the board of education." He committed himself to creating a formal link to the board of education by appointing a joint staff position. Mayor Archer has increased the role of the city in the administration of the Detroit Compact. He has placed a high-ranking police commander in each of the 33 LCCs in an effort to address the issues of crime and violence in schools.

STRUCTURAL BARRIERS

With the exception of the Detroit Compact, the analysis of supporters and opponents of education reform in Detroit clearly

show the narrow political base of support for the would-be reformers. The important theoretical issue is why this base was so narrow. There seems little doubt that part of the explanation is a lack of leadership skills for those on the board. There is ample informal evidence that members of the board of education were not sensitive to the need to forge broad coalitions to implement local policy. Their impatience to implement a reform agenda for DPS was sometimes interpreted as arrogance by those who were affected by the proposed changes. The board particularly underestimated the political power and determination of the district's labor unions. HOPE reformers were generally viewed as excellent visionaries, but poor implementors. The HOPE board also feuded with the reform superintendent, Deborah McGriff, over the direction of the agenda. The reformers' urgency and recklessness in implementing their change agenda appeared to be an act of political naïveté in which short-term gains came at the expense of long-term coalition sustainability.

Although lack of individual leadership skills clearly contributed to the collapse of educational reform in Detroit, there also appear to be important structural constraints to the creation of a politically viable reform coalition. Perhaps most important is the fragmentation of political authority. Given the importance of the mayor's role as a center of political authority in the city, the formal separation of city government and the board of education makes it difficult to create broad coalitions around educational issues. Consider, for example, the difference between Detroit and Baltimore. In contrast to Detroit, Baltimore's mayor has executive authority over the school system. The Baltimore Board of School Commissioners is appointed by the mayor, and the schools budget must be approved by the mayor and city council. In his first inaugural address in 1988, Baltimore Mayor Kurt Schmoke vowed to make Baltimore "the city that reads" (Orr, 1992). It is difficult to imagine how a mayor in Detroit might make education the center of a political agenda, even if he or she wished to do so. There is simply no capacity to directly affect school policy. The head of a nonprofit community organization observed:

> I think education has its own unique leadership, the board of education, which may be to the detriment of progress sometimes. . . . [they] don't listen to anyone else, and that's why . . . the mayor needs to be more influential and involved. . . . The school board maybe should be appointed by the mayor so that there is some accountability overall.

A Detroit city councilperson expressed the need for city-school joint ventures around neighborhood-based recreation and after-school activities. The general result of a structure of autonomous and separate political jurisdictions is an isolated, specialized system of education with limited accountability to a larger political system or regime framework. An unfortunate consequence of jurisdictional turf within the city limits is an inability to arrive at a community-wide vision for education improvement and a community-wide consensus for system change. A former school board member commented:

> It seems to me . . . for the city to move forward that all of the major stakeholders—business, religious, the school system, the city government stakeholders—have all got to come to the table and agree that in order to move Detroit forward, we all have a responsibility to make that happen.

A second structural impediment to school improvement is the fragmented government within the Detroit metropolitan region. Although the Detroit Compact is noted as a major accomplishment, bringing diverse interests together, stakeholders cite lack of regional partnerships and collaborative relationships. Another former board of education member contended that major players do not work well together, claiming an inability to get the board of education, the city council, and the county commission together. "And if those bodies ever functioned with one goal in one direction, it would be a powerful force."

CIVIC CULTURE

Reinforcing the fragmented political structure of the city, is an underlying political culture that also mitigates against educational reform. Three elements of this culture are of particular importance.

The first is a set of strong informal norms stressing the autonomy of decision makers within specific substantive areas. Such norms strongly reinforce the dispersion of policy capacity introduced by the structural fragmentation of political authority. There seems to be no such thing as a broad policy mandate in the civic and political culture of contemporary Detroit. No single public position appears to be given the authority to speak for the city. Even the capacity of the mayor is limited. The limitations of school board membership were made painfully clear to three members of the HOPE team and several of its allies. Skillful politicians from all corners operate within a narrow base of support.

An important implication of such domains of influence leads to a second aspect of Detroit civic culture—an emphasis on the insider. Policy arenas are viewed as relatively closed to those not intimately engaged in the arena. This leads to the development of relatively rigid expectations and boundaries around substantive areas, as well as a narrowing of the prospective leadership pool. A newspaper reporter covering education in Detroit discussed the DFT's resistance to change:

> They've been working in the school system for 30 years and are used to doing things a certain way and they don't want to change, so even though there have been some good ideas, if people in the school district don't embrace those ideas, then I think they will have difficulty being successful. I mean, Detroit, is the home of the labor movement, the teachers' union is very strong. If the teachers' union doesn't give the educational initiative its stamp of approval, it doesn't succeed in Detroit.

A third feature of the city's political culture is combative style that dominates political interactions. A highly charged, unsettled political atmosphere, a labor-management paradigm of confrontation and conflict, the underlying politics of race, and dichotomies of neighborhood versus business interests and city versus suburban interests does not create a fertile ground for sustained policy innovation.

Reinforcing and magnifying each element of this civic culture is the overwhelming power of race. Without a doubt, race remains the single most important factor in understanding the political culture of the Detroit metropolitan area. City-suburban conflict,

often inseparable from the issue of race, is intricately interwoven into Detroit's civic culture. Any effort to link economic elites to issues of school reform must confront a long-standing and bitter history of race relations in the region. The sense of estrangement across racial communities is strong:

> One of the problems has been the majority of businesses or business leaders in Detroit are people of noncolor, the majority of businesses are not in Detroit. So there is this stigma among the Black community that here are some people who are not part of us who are trying to make decisions about what is best for us.

CONCLUSIONS

School reform in Detroit provides dramatic evidence of the complexity of social action. In particular, it reveals the interdependency of various groups and actors in the city. The electoral coalition that captured control of the city's school board in 1988 proved inadequate to the task of fully implementing their reform agenda. This is not to suggest, however, that the reform board was unable to make a significant impact on the district. For example, often overlooked in the controversy generated by educational initiatives of the HOPE team are the successful fiscal policies of the reform board. Throughout the 1980s, the DPS ran significant budget deficits, at times coming to the brink of state receivership. Interim superintendent Porter (hired by the HOPE board) is widely credited with instituting a number of important fiscal controls to take the DPS out of deficit. Porter's effort to eliminate the deficit set the foundation for structural reform. It also generated a good deal of external political support for a successful millage election in 1991.

Concrete efforts to improve education in the city met with different fates. The Detroit Compact is clearly the most successful of the HOPE-supported reforms. It has survived four superintendents and currently extends commitments to students into the year 2003. The compact has successfully built a network of supporters both at the city and school level. Significantly, the range of actors involved in the compact has steadily grown since the compact was

established. This growth has occurred at both the city and school level. Less successful have been efforts to create schools of choice. Although supporters of choice schools have been able to keep such schools on the political agenda, they have faced strong opposition from advocates of traditional neighborhood schools. Although 34 schools of choice were created during the reform period, without a strong coalition in support of those schools, the question remains at how much restructuring is occurring within those programs. As a business respondent claimed, "If your choice is between two poor schools, that's not much of a choice." Without question, the least successful proposal advanced by the HOPE-dominated board was empowerment schools. Indeed, resistance to empowerment schools on the part of the unions and community leaders is widely seen as the basis of the electoral defeat of the HOPE coalition in 1992.

The dramatic collapse of the HOPE coalition was a failure in political leadership. However, the dimensions of that failure need to be understood. It was not simply a failure in strategy or interpersonal skills. Rather, it followed from a lack of understanding that the policy process is more than the design and delivery of concrete goods. The heart of the political process is the creation of social mechanisms to promote public goals. Although there is ample evidence that such coalitions can be constructed for economic development, the question of whether this can be done for public education remains open. Detroit's experience with its compact suggests that at least some reforms can generate sufficient community support to sustain policy change. In contrast, empowerment schools show how difficult this process can be. It also shows that political leaders who extend beyond their capacity may not only fail to implement a specific policy, but may lose their right to govern. The failure of much of the HOPE reform agenda points to the weakness of a policy strategy that focuses only on program design. Henig (1994) argues that a key problem in education reform, also evident in other areas of public policy, is that debate all too often starts and ends with the question "What should we do?" This question implies that there is a technical solution that once identified, is readily recognized and easily put into practice.

This implies that there is an identifiable set of pedagogical techniques or organizational adjustments that, once injected into the local arena, will generate a positive and self-sustaining impetus to reform. The problem has been the ability to sustain a coalition around a reform agenda. There is no shortage of good ideas floating around in what Kingdon (1984) refers to as the "policy primeval soup." The recent history of education reform in Detroit shows that success or failure of reform is based as much on the ability to create a sustainable political coalition around educational issues as on good ideas and solid information. Henig (1994) argues:

> Making social policy work means adjusting the original conception to local circumstance. It means investing in it the resources and effort needed to give it a chance to succeed. It means monitoring feedback and responding to new information and changing conditions. . . . It means maintaining allegiance to collective solutions even when some individuals and groups might solve their own problems by going it alone. For many policies—especially like education, in which most of the important consequences are likely to become evident only after considerable time has passed—it means exercising the patience to wait for results without abandoning the effort prematurely.

Reform failures around the country have indicated that lack of know-how is not the major problem. The problem, as evident in the Detroit case, lies in building coalitions and institutions capable of handling the difficulties that change brings. A DFT union respondent argued:

> It's one thing to proclaim a program or a policy, but you have to set about convincing others that this program or policy is good. My experience has been that you do this or you attempt to do this before you get too far out in front or you get too public. In other words, my own style, and, I think, the style of other opinion leaders in the city, is go talk to others and try to shape it and mold it so that where they disagree, we can work it out before it goes public. Some don't do this and they learn slowly, and with some bitterness in a few cases, that just proclaiming something as the latest miracle decision doesn't make it so or it doesn't make people agree with it. So, I believe you sell your program almost on a one-by-one or individual-by-individual basis or a group-by- group basis before you go public with it.

This political view of education reform is supported by recent education scholarship. Sirotnik (1991) concludes, "to ignore the intimate connections between school and community in the reform and restructuring of urban schooling is to condemn attempts to almost certain failure" (p. 264). Fullan (1991) also directs attention away from thinking about education change from innovation to institution building, focusing on the social and physical context of change as well as the plurality of interests and visions of those involved.

In the Detroit case, one important caveat needs to be added. There is some danger in too closely identifying leaders and the reforms that they champion. To identify the demise of the reform candidates with reform itself is to ignore the important contextual issues of policy creation and implementation. Baumgartner and Jones (1993) note that policy does not always advance in an evolutionary, incremental manner. Rather modest structural changes can sometimes generate a dramatic positive feedback process that can fundamentally change political outputs. Critical observers of Detroit education policy point out that although the official rhetoric of the board has dramatically moderated, many institutional changes introduced by the HOPE team remain in place. Thus incremental changes may yet be occurring. Indeed, there is a feeling among many interested in school reform that with the current insider leadership, the district will be much more likely to actually facilitate more change. A former HOPE member, defeated in 1992 argued:

> The major change has been a willingness to engage in conversation as to whether the DPS system should continue in its present form. That's been the biggest change. Previously it was accepted as given.

Implicit in this argument is a conception of policy change as a lurch followed by a period of incremental adjustment until some new equilibrium is established. Even some of the defeated HOPE reformers have come to embrace this idea, citing, for example, the development of strong community support for local empowerment schools as a potential source of systematic change. Clearly, a short-term analysis of leadership and institutional capacity, al-

though important elements of the puzzle, provide only the first step in understanding education policy in our nation's largest cities.

NOTES

1. HOPE was a campaign slogan (Frank *H*ayden, David *O*lmstead, and Larry *P*atrick for *E*ducation—later joined by Joseph Blending).

2. The shifting policy subsystem may have significant process as well as policy implications. For example, efforts to use private and semiprivate institutions to promote economic growth may have the direct effect of reducing public accountability and oversight of public policy. See Hula (1993).

3. This argument is broadly consistent with widespread popular demands for less comprehensive and more decentralized public institutions. See, for example, Gormley (1991). Specific issues concerning education are discussed by Henig (1994). Hatry, Morely, Ashford, and Wyatt, (1993) offer some cautions about the likely effect of decentralization in a program evaluation of such efforts in 19 schools.

4. Any school is eligible to become an empowered school if the following representative numbers vote yes: administration and teachers, 75% (by secret ballot); parents, 55%; support staff, 55%; and students, 55% DPS (Design for Excellence).

5. On June 5, 1990, interim Superintendent John Porter and the Detroit Board of Education received the endorsement by the administrators and teachers unions through a *Memorandum of Understanding: Empowerment and School of Choice*. By February of 1992, the unions had issued an embargo on empowerment, which virtually blocked further implementation of the concept.

REFERENCES

Baumgartner, F., & Jones, B. (1993). *Agenda and instability in American politics*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Chubb, J. E., & Moe, T. M. (1990). *Politics, markets, and America's schools*. Washington DC: Brooking Institution.

Cuban, L. (1990). Reforming again, again, again. *Educational Researcher, 19*(1), 3-13.

Detroit Public Schools (DPS). *Design for excellence*. Detroit: Author.

Elkin, S. L. (1987). *City and regime in the American republic*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Elmore, R. F. (1990). *Restructuring schools: The next generation of educational reform*. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.

Fainstein, S., Fainstein, N., Hill, R. C., Judd, D. R., & Smith, M. P. (1986). *Restructuring the city: The political economy of urban redevelopment*. New York: Longman.

Fullan, M. G. (1991). *The new meaning of educational change*. New York: Teachers College Press.

Goodland, J. (1984). *A place called school*. New York: McGraw-Hill.

Gormley, W. (1991). *Privatization and its alternatives*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.

Hatry, H. P., Morely, E., Ashford, B., & Wyatt, T. M. (1993). *Implementing school-based management*. Washington, DC: Urban Institute Press.

Henig, J. R. (1994). *Rethinking school choice: Limits on the market metaphor*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Hula, R. C. (1993). The state reassessed: The privatization of local politics. In E. G. Goetz & S. E. Clark (Eds.), *The new localism*. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.

Judd, D., & Kantor, P. (1992). *Enduring tensions in urban politics*. New York: Macmillan.

Judd, D., & Parkinson, M. (1990). *Leadership and urban regeneration: Cities in North America and Europe*. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.

Katz, M. B. (1987). *Reconstructing American education*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Kingdon, J. W. (1984). *Agendas, alternatives, and public policies*. Boston: Little, Brown.

Lieberman, M. (1993). *Public education: An autopsy*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Orr, M. (1992). Urban regimes and human capital politics: A study of Baltimore. *Journal of Urban Affairs, 14*, 173-187.

Powell, A. G., Farrar, E., & Cohen, J. (1985). *The shopping mall high school: Winners and losers in the education marketplace*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.

Sarason, S. (1982). *The culture of the school and the problem of change*. Boston: Allyn & Bacon.

Sarason, S. (1990). *The predictable failure of educational reform*. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.

Sirotnik, A. (1990). *Evaluation and social justice: Issues in public education*. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.

Stone, C. N. (1989). *Regime politics: Governing Atlanta 1946-1988*. Lawrence: University of Kansas Press.

Stone, C. N., & Sanders, H. T. (1987). *The politics of urban development*. Lawrence: University of Kansas Press.

Yin, R. K. (1993). *Applications of case study research*. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.