Perhaps the biggest story of the surprising 2016 presidential election was Donald Trump's victories in the Midwest, which, according to President Obama’s 2012 campaign manager David Plouffe, left the “blue Big Ten firewall in ruins.” The *Columbus Dispatch* reported that “one of the more stunning aspects of the surprise presidential victory of Republican Donald Trump was the way that states in the industrial Midwest fell like dominoes for him.” Trump won Wisconsin, Michigan, Iowa, and Ohio, all of which Barack Obama had won in both 2008 and 2012. Wisconsin had not voted for the Republican candidate for president since the Reagan 49-state landslide of 1984 and Michigan had not since 1988. Iowa had supported Michael Dukakis, Bill Clinton twice, and narrowly supported Al Gore in 2000 and George Bush in 2004 before voting for Obama twice. Ohio served as a classic bellwether and had voted to support the winner of the presidential election...
race every year since John F. Kennedy in 1960. One goal of this article is to explore the surprising shift in voting patterns in Midwestern states during the 2016 election and to draw on some of the work done in Midwestern history to better understand and contextualize this shift, which, if it becomes semi-permanent, could mark a major transition in presidential politics. Another goal of this article is to highlight the possibilities for future research in the field of Midwestern studies which have been prompted by these recent events and to suggest additional research possibilities more generally.

One method of beginning a review of the recent election and tapping the available corpus of work on the history of the Midwest is to examine the origins of the Republican Party in the Midwest and its subsequent fortunes. Organized in 1854 as an anti-slavery and anti-Southern party – and thereby specifically a regional party and one that found particular support among Midwestern farmers – the GOP first took shape in meeting halls in Ripon, Wisconsin and Jackson, Michigan and Crawfordsville, Iowa (there is debate about the precise origin of the party). The Republican Party swept the Midwest during the 1850s and the first person to win a presidential race as a Republican was Illinoisan Abraham Lincoln in 1860. The areas of the Midwest which were settled by New England Yankees and Pennsylvania Quakers and Germans tended to be more supportive of the GOP than areas of the Midwest settled by Southerners, who had migrated in from the solidly Democratic South. The influence of early settlement patterns on present day voting results is still visible, although party loyalties have flipped due to the rise of the GOP in the South and the transformation of areas settled by New Englanders into Democratic territory.

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6 Most specifically, I hope this article will provide research ideas to the students in my class POLS/HIST 492/592: “The Political Culture of the Midwest” at the University of South Dakota. More generally, I hope this article will assist those interested in participating in a planned book of essays about post-World War II Midwestern politics.


From the time of the Civil War until the Great Depression, the Republican Party remained dominant in the Midwest and presidents such as U.S. Grant (Illinois), Rutherford Hayes (Ohio), James Garfield (Ohio), Benjamin Harrison (Indiana), William McKinley (Ohio), William Howard Taft (Ohio), Warren Harding (Ohio), and Herbert Hoover (Iowa) hailed from the region. In the latter half of the nineteenth-century the region, which had mostly been settled by agrarian yeoman, became much less dependent on agriculture as a robust industrial economy took hold and the national GOP made efforts to protect Midwestern industry by way of high tariffs. In the early decades of the twentieth-century, the factories of the Midwest were highly productive and Henry Ford built his famous plants in Dearborn, Michigan and other companies such as General Motors took root in Detroit. The raw materials for these industries were shipped in via the Great Lakes from Minnesota’s Iron Range and from the southern Midwest’s coal fields. During the labor crunch of the World War I era, many African Americans left the segregated South and moved to Midwestern cities to find work in the Midwest’s new factories and thereby created another major interest group in the Midwest that was especially influential in cities such as Chicago, Detroit, Cleveland, and Milwaukee.

The crisis of the Great Depression jolted the Midwest, as it did the entire nation, and Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal caused the region to partially re-align politically toward the Democrats, although the GOP still remained a strong force, especially in small towns, rural areas, and suburbs, all of which caused many areas of the Midwest to be politically competitive. In stark comparison to the era of pre-1930s GOP dominance in the Midwest, New Deal farm programs and New Deal labor laws drew more Midwesterners toward the Democrats.10 During the New Deal, Republicans also began to lose their hold on the African American voter, who had previously supported the party of Lincoln as liberators but would later become a pillar of the Democratic coalition.11

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New Deal's promotion of organized labor was especially influential in the Midwest's industrial areas, which saw the rise of powerful unions such as the United Auto Workers which were loyal to the Democratic Party. In the later stages of the twentieth-century, however, the once-powerful and employment-generating manufacturing sector of the Midwest began to shrivel in the face of stiff foreign competition, the movement of factories to low-wage countries such as Mexico, and automation. The smaller number of farmers in the Midwest and the Democrats' traditional focus, at least in the North, on urban voters and its more recent focus on coastal voters caused a widening disconnect with rural Midwesterners. In broad strokes, these were the forces and trends at work in the 2016 presidential race in the Midwest.

THE RURAL MIDWEST VOTE

During the 2016 presidential race Midwestern “outstates,” or places outside of metro areas of a million–plus people, strongly supported Trump. Outstate areas accounted for 61% of the vote in Wisconsin, 47% in Michigan, 100% in Iowa (where there is no metro of over a million people), and 44% in Ohio. President Barack Obama had won outstate Wisconsin (outside of Milwaukee and Madison) with 54% and 50% in 2008 and 2012 but Clinton only received the support of 41% of rural Wisconsinites; Obama had won outstate Michigan (outside of Detroit and Grand Rapids) with 55% and 52% but Clinton only received 41%; Obama had won outstate Ohio (outside of Cleveland, Columbus, and Cincinnati) with 48% and 47% but Clinton only received 35%. In Wisconsin’s 46 non-metro or rural counties Trump won by nearly 20%, a major shift from 2012,

672; Mark Stern, “Party Alignments and Civil Rights: Then and Now,” Presidential Studies Quarterly vol. 25, no. 3 (Summer 1995), 414.
nearly 70% of the vote. Clinton only won 8 Michigan counties, all of which were urban or university-oriented. One consultant blamed Democrats for focusing too much on urban Detroit: “You can saturate Detroit all you want, but when you drive past 23 Mile or north of Bay City, all you saw was Trump. There was no effort whatsoever to make a dent in that area.”

Trump won Michigan’s rural areas and small towns 57%-38%, improving on Romney’s 2012 margin of 53%-46%.

The Milwaukee Journal Sentinel noted that it was “hard to overstate Trump’s dominance in rural Wisconsin” and reported that he won rural voters by a 27% margin. In 2008, Obama had carried the same rural voters by 8%. Trump won 18 rural counties in Wisconsin that Obama had won in 2012 (overall, Trump won 22 counties in Wisconsin that Obama had won in 2012). One of the “last bastions of rural white Democrats in America,” the area of Southwestern Wisconsin near the Mississippi River known as The Driftless, went for Trump. Counties such as Pepin, Buffalo, Crawford, Vernon, Grant, Lafayette, and Trempealeau, which had not voted for a Republican presidential candidate in decades, supported Trump. Trempealeau County was made famous in historical circles by the Nebraskan Merle Curti, who conducted an intense microcosmic analysis of the settlement and development of the county while a professor at the University of Wisconsin-Madison. Trump won Wisconsin’s rural areas and small towns 63%-34%, improving on Romney’s 2012 margin of 53%-46%. After the election, some Democratic consultants urged party leaders to not be distracted by these poor badger state returns and argued that the future of the Democratic Party was in the diversifying Sun Belt and South: “It does not lie in rural Wisconsin.”

The two states Clinton won in the Midwest, Minnesota and Illinois, were highly influenced by singular and dense urban areas, the Twin Cities and Chicago. In perhaps the biggest surprise of the 2016 election, Trump only lost Minnesota, which is known for its liberal politics and had not voted for a Republican presidential candidate since 1972, by 1.5%. In the famously labor-oriented Iron Range, Trump won Hibbing, the hometown of Bob Dylan. But 60% of the Minnesotans live in the Twin Cities metro area, making the dominance of one urban core in Minnesota similar to the role of Chicago in Illinois. Minnesota’s urban center simply holds more votes than “outstate Minnesota,” where Trump did well. Even in northern Minnesota, “long a Democratic-Farmer Labor stronghold,” Trump won Beltrami, Itasca, Mahnomen, and Koochiching counties. Overall, Trump won 78 of Minnesota’s 87 counties. In Illinois, Trump also won the vast majority of counties – 91 of 102 – but Clinton won big in Chicago’s Cook County, where she earned half of her votes, and thus won the state.

The great disparity in voting between rural counties and urban areas proved true across the Midwest. Trump won 93 of 99 counties in Iowa, for example, and flipped 32 counties that had voted for Obama in 2012. Trump’s Iowa victory was bigger than Reagan’s 1984 reelection landslide. In a pattern common to the larger Midwest, Trump lost six counties in Iowa that were home to urban centers (Des Moines, Cedar Rapids, and Davenport) and universities (University of Iowa, Iowa State University, and the University of Northern Iowa) but he won the remaining 93. Trump won 88 of 92 counties in Indiana; 75 of 83 counties in Michigan; 61 of 66 counties in South Dakota; 81 of 88 counties in Ohio; and 59 of 72 counties in Wisconsin. Trump won every county in Kansas but one (home to the University of Kansas); every county but two in North Dakota (which were Indian reservation counties); every county but two in Nebraska (which were
home to Omaha and the University of Nebraska); and every county but three in Missouri (which were home to the University of Missouri, Kansas City, and St. Louis). And, as noted, he won 78 of Minnesota’s 87 counties and 91 of Illinois’s 102 counties. The rural Midwestern counties where Clinton performed well, it should be noted, were often Indian reservation counties, the electoral history of which would make an excellent research project, as would the history of internal reservation politics, which has received minimal attention from scholars.

A longer-term perspective on the fortunes of Democrats in the rural Midwest would make some of the returns of 2016 less jarring. The GOP originated in the rural Midwest, after all, and the GOP has historically been dominant with rural voters, at least until the Great Depression. Richard Jensen and Paul Kleppner did much to explain these voting patterns for the late-nineteenth century. In contrast to the criticisms of some Democrats after the 2016 election, however, there have been prominent Democratic leaders who have worked hard to earn rural Midwestern votes. This would include the many Midwesterners in FDR’s Department of Agriculture who fought for policies to maintain the long-standing agrarian order of small farmers in the Midwest and, in the process, had to battle many Easterners who had little sympathy for the region. It would also include the farm policies of Missourian Harry Truman during the 1940s and also Hubert Humphrey, who was elected mayor of Minneapolis in 1945 but then went on to a long career in the U.S. Senate and in national politics where he was a vigorous supporter of Midwestern family farms. George McGovern’s entry into politics via his criticism of farm policies during the 1950s serves as another example. But these examples also serve to make the point that Democrats in recent years have had few prominent voices from rural America and that their embrace of various forms of cultural liberation have alienated them from more traditional and conservative rural parts of the Midwest.


Despite some work on the history of the farm program and of progressive farm advocates, which is, on balance, fairly dated, this scholarship is not extensive. If there is one area of the Midwest deserving of particular attention from historians and researchers more generally it is the rural Midwest, which has not been a popular area of study for scholars in recent decades. Such efforts will be able to rely on important building blocks. The unwinding of the old agrarian rural order and rural depopulation and the resulting economic friction and cultural consequences for the rural Midwest are especially important topics. This would certainly include the 1980s farm crisis. Given the themes of the 2016 election, rural v. urban cultural tensions are also important to explore, including their long history. So are tensions over the coastal dominance of the media and entertainment industries and rural Midwestern protests thereof. The growing number of studies of American conservatism published over the past decade have done little to examine the rural Midwest, which, after the 2016 election, is now particularly relevant. These studies would be especially valuable if they extended back into the nineteenth-century and the era when the GOP was first organized and even before given the limited historiography on this topic.

**WORKING CLASS VOTERS**

In addition to a strong performance by the GOP in rural areas during the 2016 election, the party also performed well among non-college educated whites, some of whom lived in rural areas.

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46 See *Middle West Review* vol. 2, no. 1 (Fall 2015) for a special issue on the 1980s farm crisis.


but many of whom would be more closely associated with Midwestern industrial areas. This group favored Trump by a margin of 39% (Romney only won this group by 26%). These numbers indicate that many traditionally working class and Democratic areas of the “Rust Belt” moved toward Trump. In the wake of the New Deal during the 1940s, nearly 70% of workers voted for Democrats, but this had fallen to 35% by 1980 and continued to fall in subsequent decades. In 2016, Trump won working class white men by a 50% margin; Trump won 67% of all white working class voters. Obama had won union households by 18% in 2012, but Clinton, according to the exit polls, only won them by 8%, or 51%-43%. According to the AFL-CIO’s own survey, union support for Clinton came in at 56% compared to 65% for Obama in 2012. In Michigan, Trump won working class whites overall by a 61%-31% margin. In Ohio, Trump won union voters 49%-44%, a major turnaround from 2012, when Obama won 60% of Ohio’s union voters.

Robert Bruno, director of the Labor Education Program at the University of Illinois-Chicago, observed that the “Democratic Party has lost its footing among working people and allowed the Republican Party to become the party of the working class. And that’s an astonishing thing to have to admit.” Ohio State University political scientist Paul Beck saw the 2016 voting results as a “white working class revolt against the Democratic Party.” “Politically, it’s a complete rout,” said John Russo, one-time director of the Center for Working-Class Studies at Youngstown State University.
University. Trump’s message that free trade deals hurt workers, especially the North American Free Trade Agreement passed by the Clinton administration during the early 1990s, proved especially powerful in the industrial Midwest. Sociologist Michael McQuarrie emphasized the regional nature of the election and how Clinton “was a terrible candidate for the Rust Belt” given her husband’s shepherding of NAFTA and because the Clintons were “avatars of free trade, financialization and identity politics, a triumvirate of characteristics that associates them pretty directly with what many people associate with the causes of Rust Belt decline and crisis.” “Trump is president,” he argued, “because of a regional revolt.”

In Michigan, commentators again focused on the importance of Macomb County, a working class area next to Detroit that John F. Kennedy had won in 1960 with 63% of the vote and LBJ had won four years later with 75% of the vote. Macomb County became the symbolic home of the “Reagan Democrats” as it flipped to supporting Ronald Reagan, who won 66% of the vote in the county in 1984. Trump won Macomb County 54%-42%, prevailing in the county by roughly 50,000 votes in a year when turnout in the county was up 4%. In 2012, Obama had won Macomb County 52%-48%, or by 16,000 votes. In 2008, Obama had won Macomb County 53%-44%, or by 39,000 votes. Reporting from Warren, Michigan in Macomb County revealed a deep distrust of Clinton and also indicated that voters were not enthusiastic about Trump but chose him because


they wanted the change in direction that Trump provided.66 This major shift in Macomb County was part of what Wayne State University political science professor Timothy Bledsoe called a “re-volt of working class whites…who’d been part of the Democratic coalition for years.”67 Overall, Trump flipped 12 Michigan counties that voted for Obama in 2012, including working class counties such as Bay, Eaton, Monroe, and Saginaw.68 In the final tally, Trump won Michigan by 10,704 votes.69

In Wisconsin, Trump also benefitted from a “seismic shift in the blue collar vote.”70 While Romney won the white working class in Wisconsin by 8% in 2012, Trump won them by 28% in 2016.71 In 2012, Obama won union households in Wisconsin by 33%; Clinton won them in 2016 by 10%.72 In LaCrosse, Obama won 58% of the vote in 2012, but Clinton only won 44% in 2016; in Racine, Obama won 51% in 2012, but Clinton only won 37% in 2016.73 Trump also won Green Bay’s Brown County, a semi-industrial swing county where Clinton underperformed Obama in 2012 by 7%, and in the broader and frequently contested Fox Valley.74 Kenosha, south of Milwaukee and north of Chicago, had voted for Obama and Bill Clinton twice and against Bush twice and had supported Mondale and Dukakis in 1984 and 1988. But in 2016 it voted for Trump.75 Similar to the doubts expressed by Michigan voters, 63% of Wisconsinites had an unfavorable view of Trump, but he still won.76

Similar patterns prevailed in Ohio. Trump won Stark County, home to the city of Canton, a once-prominent steel town, by 17% compared to a draw between Romney and Obama in 2012; Trump tied in Lorain County, once home to Toni Morrison and which favored Obama by 14% in 2012. Trump lost Summit County, home to Akron, but cut the Democratic margin from 2012 in half and he won 24 of the county’s 31 towns. In Youngstown, which Obama had won by 63%-35% in 2012, Trump essentially drew even, losing only 50%-47% in a traditionally Democratic county. In May 2016 the long-serving chairman of the Mahoning County (Youngstown) Democratic Party had sent a detailed memo to the Clinton campaign about the erosion of support for her in the area and the growing amount of support for Trump but he received no response. The chairman had to kick off 18 members of his Democratic central committee because they were supporting Trump. After the election, Democratic Congressman Tim Ryan, who represented Youngstown, led an effort to topple the Democratic leader in the U.S. House of Representatives, the Bay Area Californian Nancy Pelosi. Ryan’s home of Trumbull County, Ohio had just voted for a Republican presidential candidate for the first time since 1972. Ryan argued that the Democrats had become a coastal party and had forgotten the Midwest, but he unsurprisingly lost the vote in a caucus in which a third of the membership was from California, New York, and Massachusetts.

The support for Trump among working class voters was further highlighted by his diminished support in the wealthy, traditionally-Republican suburbs of the Midwest, where Clinton’s criticisms of Trump’s brashness found a more receptive audience. Trump underperformed, for exam-

ple, in the “affluent, conservative Midwestern suburban stronghold” of Hamilton County, Indiana.84 So too in Boone County in suburban Indianapolis, where Trump performed 8% poorer than Romney.85 In Ohio, Trump’s support in the Columbus suburb of Delaware County dropped from Romney’s in 2012 – the county gave Trump the lowest margin of victory, 16%, for any Republican presidential candidate since Barry Goldwater.86 The same pattern was evident in the wealthier sections of Summit County, Ohio around Akron.87 In Michigan’s tony Oakland County Trump also slipped 3% below Romney. Trump’s margin of victory in key Republican suburban counties in Wisconsin also slipped. In Waukesha County, for example, which Romney won by 34%, Trump only won by 28% and Trump trailed the performance of Republican U.S. Senate candidate Ron Johnson by 10% in the county.88 Similarly, in Ozaukee County, Romney won by 30% in 2012, but Trump only won by 19%.89 These suburban counties in Wisconsin had been the “reddest” counties in Wisconsin in recent decades but in 2016 that designation went to more rural Northern counties, a sign of Trump’s strength among working class Midwestern voters and lessened support, vis a vis Romney, among wealthier Republicans. To underscore the point, River Hills, the wealthiest place in Wisconsin, voted Democratic for the first time in 90 years.90

However the role of workers in the 2016 election season is ultimately interpreted, the long-term development of the industrial Midwest has proved to be fertile territory for historians. Labor historians have studied the region’s industrial workers for decades.91 This includes the study of masculine ideals in the era of industrialism, a particularly important topic given the prominent role of working class men in the outcome of the 2016 election.92 The role of religion and tradition among

workers and workers’ role in modern cultural conflicts are similarly important. So is the role of 1960s and post-1960s cultural liberalism. How all these cultural conflicts corresponded with a painful era of deindustrialization is also critical to understand. For future researchers, the long-term story of how Midwestern workers once-loyal to the Democrats of the New Deal era became frustrated with later Democrats who organized as a “new party of multicultural cosmopolitanism,” as some frustrated Democratic strategists see it, is ideal for future study and highly relevant to Midwestern history.

THE AFRICAN AMERICAN VOTE

Another major factor in Clinton’s defeats in the Midwest was her weak performance with African American voters. In Milwaukee city council District 15, for example, which is 84% black, voter turnout dropped 20% and local voters were unenthusiastic about Clinton. The Clinton campaign failed to send prominent surrogates such as the Obamas to Milwaukee in order to shore up this vote and Clinton herself did not visit Wisconsin after the July convention. As a result, Clinton received 289,000 votes in Milwaukee County, down from Obama’s 328,000 in 2012. The Clinton campaign devoted few resources to these key areas. The Clinton campaign and its allied groups spent more money on advertising in Omaha (presumably to help Clinton in Western Iowa) during the final weekend of the campaign than it did in Wisconsin and Michigan combined.

Democratic pollster Paul Maslin said “It’s nothing short of malpractice that [the Clinton] campaign didn’t look at the electoral college and put substantial resources into states like Michigan and Wisconsin.” 100 The Clinton campaign did seem to recognize the dire situation in Michigan a few days before the election, but they were not able to reverse the situation. 101 In heavily African American Detroit, Clinton received nearly 50,000 fewer votes than Obama had in 2012 and in Wayne County overall Clinton received nearly 80,000 fewer votes than Obama in 2012. 102 Voter turnout in Detroit dropped from 51% in 2012 to 48% in 2016. 103 In Genesee County, home to Flint, where Obama had won with 64% in 2012 and 66% in 2008, Clinton won with only 54%. 104 In Cleveland’s Cuyahoga County African American turnout was down 11% from 2012. 105 Not only was raw support for Clinton down among African Americans in 2016, but a higher percentage of African Americans supported Trump than had supported Romney in 2012. African Americans supported Clinton 88%-8%, a drop from their 93%-6% support of Obama in 2012. 106 Support for Trump among African American men actually increased to 13%. 107

Those interested in studying these patterns and the deeper story of African American voting in the Midwest will be blessed with a rich historiography. One of the more popular areas of study in African American history in recent decades has been the Great Migration of blacks from the South

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101 Brett Logiurato, “The Clinton Campaign Appears to be in Full-Blown Panic Mode Over a State that Hasn’t Gone Red in 2 Decades,” Business Insider, November 6, 2016.


107 CNN exit poll, updated November 23, 2016.
to the North and, in particular, the movement of blacks to Midwestern cities.\textsuperscript{108} Chicago in particular has drawn heavy interest from researchers.\textsuperscript{109} But Milwaukee, Cleveland, and Cincinnati have also attracted researchers.\textsuperscript{110} More recently, researchers have turned to less obvious urban areas such as the Twin Cities of Minnesota and Cedar Rapids, Iowa.\textsuperscript{111} All of these cities have also contributed to a recent round of works about the civil rights movement in the North.\textsuperscript{112} The histories of African Americans in the urban Midwest help to provide a critical context for the importance of African Americans to the Democratic coalition in states such as Michigan, where lower


\textsuperscript{111} William D. Green, Degrees of Freedom: The Origins of Civil Rights in Minnesota, 1865-1912 (Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 2015); Brie Swenson Arnold, “An Opportunity to Challenge the ‘Color Line’: Gender, Race, Ethnicity, and Women’s Labor Activism in Late Nineteenth-Century Cedar Rapids, Iowa,” Annals of Iowa vol. 74, no. 2 (Spring 2015), 101-41.

black turnout arguably cost Clinton the state in 2016. Cities such as Flint also provide an opportunity to examine the intersection of race and deindustrialization. In 1980, General Motors employed 80,000 people in Flint; today it employs 7,200. Deindustrialization in Flint was most memorably highlighted by Michael Moore’s film “Roger and Me,” which launched Moore’s career. The nexus of race and politics in Flint was further highlighted during the 2016 campaign by the debate over the Flint water crisis.

THE LATINO VOTE

Although smaller than in other regions of the United States, the Latino vote in the Midwest is also deserving of more research, which could build on some recent and important studies. This research could include the famous Trempealeau County, Wisconsin, which Trump won after a long history of the county supporting Democratic presidential candidates. Trempealeau, unlike other Midwestern counties which had suffered through the loss of manufacturing jobs, was the “most manufacturing-intensive county in Wisconsin.” It became the location of a rapid influx of Latinos to work at the dairies, Ashley Furniture, and GNP Co., a chicken producer. Its elementary school went from nearly all white to 73% Hispanic. The local fall heritage festival featuring


German and Polish food now includes a mariachi band and signs and pamphlets in Spanish.\footnote{121} Whatever the location of future research on Hispanics and the Midwest, the voting patterns should prove of interest. In 2016, among Latinos, Clinton’s support dropped to 65% from Obama’s 71% and Trump gained 2% over Romney’s performance, which surprised many commentators given Trump’s call for greater restrictions on immigration.\footnote{122}

CAMPUS VOTERS

Outside of urban concentrations of African American voters, the strongest areas of support for Democrats in the Midwest were university towns. In Wisconsin’s Dane County, home to the University of Wisconsin–Madison, Clinton won by a margin of 48%, which was higher than Obama in 2012 and higher than any other Democratic presidential candidate in history.\footnote{123} In Michigan, Clinton also won Washtenaw County, home of Ann Arbor and the University of Michigan, with 68% of the vote.\footnote{124} In Johnson County, Iowa, home to Iowa City and the University of Iowa, Clinton beat Trump 65%-27%.\footnote{125} Clinton won Clay County, South Dakota, home to the University of South Dakota, with 51% (the other four counties Clinton won in South Dakota were Indian reservation counties). Athens County, Ohio, home to Ohio University, also turned in its vote for Clinton, but she did 10% worse than Obama, a “surprisingly weak performance there,” according to analysts.\footnote{126} When Clinton staffers organized an event in Athens “they drew little interest.”\footnote{127} Tensions between university towns in the Midwest and more rural counties or outstate areas are also a worthwhile research topic. Many people in rural Wisconsin, for example, see Madison as the “domain of hippie professors and rich-kid students” and see professors as “fixated on bizarre topics of little relevance.”\footnote{128} Conflict between Madison and other parts of Wisconsin have also

been heightened in recent years by friction between Wisconsin GOP governor Scott Walker and the faculty.129 Similar dynamics are at work in Kansas with respect to Lawrence and the rest of the state and these tensions have a history worthy of deeper exploration.130 In 2016, the only county that Clinton won in Kansas was Douglas County, home to the University of Kansas.

THE CULTURAL DIVIDE

As demonstrated by the starkly different voting patterns between university counties and rural Midwestern counties, the election returns in 2016 exposed cultural divisions in the Midwest and the nation that are worthy of serious examination.131 Demographer William Frey of the Brookings Institution called this a “cultural-generation gap” between rural Republican Trump voters and modern urban Democratic voters.132 Long-time reporter, Midwestern analyst, and author Richard Longworth argued that it was “impossible to overstate the alienation between the two Americas, between global citizens and the global left-behinds, between the great cities that run the nation’s economy and media, and the hinterland that feels not only cheated but, worse, disrespected.”133 Rural whites lived, some argued, with a “cruel sense of being forgotten by the political class and condescended to by the cultural one.”134 Clinton aides conceded their failure to develop a rural strategy and admitted that connecting to rural voters is a “tough slog” given the Democrats’ progressive priorities: “It’s hard to speak to rural America. It’s very regionally specific. It feels daunting.

129 For the longer view of Madison, see the recent book by Matthew Levin, Cold War University: Madison and the New Left in the Sixties (Madison, University of Wisconsin Press, 2013).
You have these wings of the party, progressives, and it’s hard to talk to those people and people in rural America, and not seem like you’re talking out of both sides of your mouth.”

The founder of the Center for Rural Strategies, Dee Davis, noted that what “Trump did in rural areas was try to appeal to folks culturally” and contrasted this outreach with Clinton’s denunciation of half of Trump’s supporters as “deplorables.” Davis also explained how rural voters were attuned to a candidate’s statements and posture and how they focused on “the tones, the references, the culture.”

University of Wisconsin–Madison political science professor Katherine Cramer’s timely work on rural Wisconsin spoke directly to these questions of respect, alienation, and power. She revealed the “pervasiveness of resentment toward the cities and urban elites” and how rural Wisconsinites felt that the “key decisions were made in the major metro areas of Madison and Milwaukee, then decreed out to the rest of the state, with little listening being done to people like them.” Cramer downplayed race as a factor in the election and highlighted the importance of a lack of “respect” toward rural concerns and noted the belief that urban elites “ridiculed rural folks as uneducated racists.” Cramer found the emergence of a “rural consciousness,” or a local and rooted identity which contrasts with a more coastal cosmopolitanism. For these rural voters, “urban” does not connote race, but serves as “code for class, power, money, and the Democratic Party.” Cramer’s work on the development and growth of a stronger sense of rural Midwestern identity, one rooted in place and thus linked to continuing regionalist sentiments, will have major implications for Midwestern studies.

Dynamics similar to those in the rural Midwest were also highly visible within the ranks of the Midwestern working class, which was drawn to Trump’s stark rhetoric and criticism of cultural
and media elites. Long-time political commentator Ronald Brownstein argued that “Trump’s visceral connection with older, non-urban, and especially blue-collar whites has rattled the foundations of the Democrat’s Rustbelt pillars.” One MFA program professor who supported Clinton also offered thoughts on his working class background and how some Americans feel alienated from the culture and pointed to efforts to reduce the use of the phrase “Merry Christmas,” the prominence of Black Lives Matter (“What! My life doesn’t matter?”), and the frequent headlines about the need for bathrooms for the transgendered. A progressive law professor confessed her frustration with how Democrats were “obsessed with cultural issues” and how this repeatedly undermined Democrats’ ability to discuss employment and economic policy: “I fully understand why transgender bathrooms are important, but I also understand why progressives’ obsession with prioritizing cultural issues infuriates many Americans whose chief concerns are economic.”

Cultural conflicts were also linked to criticisms of the mass media, which Trump frequently lampooned. The founder of Belt Publishing (as in “Rust Belt”) in Cleveland commented after the election on the common refrain that the media had become “too centralized on the coasts; the media ignored the Midwest” and noted that Midwestern newspapers had been “decimated” and that there was “almost no regional or local media left.” The limited writing about the Midwest by coastal reporters, she noted, was targeted at a wealthy coastal audience of “virtual tourists spending a few minutes gawking at the other half” and carried a “colonial tinge.”

news media remained “pretty confined” to “the Eastern Seaboard” and in need of additional perspectives.\textsuperscript{148} The editors of the \textit{New York Times} conceded that “we’ve got to do a much better job of being on the road, out in the country, talking to different kinds of people than the people we talk to – especially if you happen to be a New York-based news organization – and remind ourselves that New York is not the real world.”\textsuperscript{149} Professor Mark Lilla, as part of his warning about the extremes of identity politics, counseled the press to “begin educating itself about parts of the country that have been ignored.”\textsuperscript{150} Others similarly urged academics to pay closer attention to the Rust Belt and its history and to life in general in the interior of the country.\textsuperscript{151} Madison Avenue advertisers, ever responsive to cultural trends, adjusted to these cultural criticisms after the election – they announced that they would be reorienting their work away from “metro elite imagery” and more toward “Des Moines and Scranton.”\textsuperscript{152} When hiring workers, they decided a diversity hire “can be a farm girl from Indiana as much as a Cuban immigrant who lives in Pensacola.”\textsuperscript{153}

The narrow visions that limited the media and advertising worlds, some argued, also prevailed in the entertainment arena. One commentator noted how an “industry arose to cater to the smug style” of the “educated, the coastal, and the professional” in the form of the “Daily Show” and other programs which “advanced the idea that liberal orthodoxy was a kind of educated savvy and that its opponents were, before anything else, stupid.”\textsuperscript{154} A key indicator of this attitude was the success of Thomas Frank’s \textit{What’s the Matter with Kansas?} (2004), which ridiculed the electoral choices of Kansans, and conservative rural Americans in general, as foolish.\textsuperscript{155} Given the extant criticisms of Hollywood and the entertainment industry, Clinton’s efforts to win Ohio through usage of celebrity surrogates such as Sally Field, the cast of \textit{The West Wing}, and \textit{Top Chef} judge Tom Colicchio

\textsuperscript{151} John Morgan, “Academics Urged to Address Trump ‘Rust Belt Revolt,’” \textit{Times Higher Education}, November 17, 2016.
\textsuperscript{152} Alexandra Bruell and Suzanne Vranica, “Trump’s Win Has Ad Agencies Rethink How They Collect Data, Recruit Staff,” \textit{Wall Street Journal}, November 21, 2016.
appeared tone deaf. The connection to entertainers and the media further contributed to a perception among working people of the Democratic Party “caring about the cultural, managerial and professional elite,” according to political historian Mary Frances Berry, and “not about them.”

These various cultural conflicts which underpinned the voting patterns in the 2016 election contests in the Midwest could yield many useful studies which delve deeply into various questions of political culture, economic history, class analysis, and agrarian politics. These studies could be combined with older studies of the region and bolster the recent efforts to revive interest in the Midwest led by the Midwestern History Association. These studies would be particularly important if 2016 proves to be a major turning point in Midwestern voting patterns. But even if the voting of 2016 proves to be a momentary deviation from a longer-term pattern, these studies will significantly advance our collective knowledge of the Midwest, a region whose history has been sadly neglected in recent decades.

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