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Phenomenology and the Rehabilitation of Philosophy



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Introduction

The question of the nature and scope of philosophical discourse is one of a contentious nature. The very direction of the field itself is often shifted away from its platonic roots in one of two general directions.¹ First, some postmodernist thinkers have gone so far as to claim the death of what people would generally describe as academic philosophy and, often times, of the notion of objective truth in general. Similar to this, other thinkers have likewise rejected past methods of philosophy but have instead conducted inquiries using the tools of the various physical or psychological sciences, which they claim have reaped more sure and tangible progress in their particular fields. Sciences such as psychology and semiotics have often times been used to completely replace the fields of epistemology and ontology. Much of the current trend is to declare the classical practice of philosophy dead and obsolete because it is thought to be intrinsically impossible, or to simply absorb it into one of the various other “sciences.”² Even though the individuals that hold these ideas arrive at the conclusion they do, there is one general qualm that seems to run through the thought of both of the aforementioned groups. This concern is the seeming inability of philosophers throughout the ages to come to sure conclusions regarding given problems.³

While this objection is not entirely without ground, it will be argued in this paper that this is not truly an accurate appraisal of the situation. Indeed, as many modern thinkers have suggested, it is a case of philosophy needing to be reformulated into a fuller and corrected manifestation of its original intention. I argue that the contemporary theory of philosophy known as phenomenology has the tools to deal with the difficult questions of (and

challenges to) philosophy. However, this method of philosophy is not an entirely new way of conducting an inquiry, but rather presents a refined and clarified view of the way in which philosophy was originally formulated. As will be shown, the methods of phenomenology are simply ways of clarifying and augmenting the classical contributions to philosophy while, in addition, offering new perspectives and insights into the age-old questions surrounding philosophy and why these questions are often clouded in confusion and ambiguity. Special attention shall be paid to the phenomenological reduction and some of the initial findings of the movement, as well as their implications. Furthermore, the significance of these findings in relation to their status as reactions against prior movements in philosophy will also be examined. However, before this can be undertaken, attention must be paid to the situation in modern philosophy that precipitated the need for phenomenology. In addition, the classical conception of philosophical realism must be briefly examined as well to gain a full grasp of the situation.

The Classical View of Philosophy

Originally philosophy began not strictly as the clearly-stated study of the nature of truth, but rather as a form of scientific cosmology that attempted to figure out the ultimate causes that permeated reality. Thales, one of the progenitors of the movement toward philosophy, with his identification of the element of water as the basic unitary feature of matter, was the first in a series of Greek thinkers that sought to identify what this unity consisted of.⁴ One basic feature of all of the Greek thinkers was the desire to come to an understanding of the broadest principles of reality. This quest was generally confused and convoluted as

1. Robert Sokolowski, *Introduction to Phenomenology* (New York: Cambridge, 2000), 198-202.

2. In this paper, the term “science” shall be broadly used to describe any organized body of knowledge.

3. See also: Dietrich Von Hildebrand, *What is Philosophy?* (Chicago: Franciscan, 1991), 1-10.

4. A.H. Armstrong, *An Introduction to Ancient Philosophy* (Totowa: Rowman & Allenheld, 1983), 1-3.

one would expect in a new field of study that must, by practical necessity, grapple with ways to express brand new ideas. However, what united most of these earlier thinkers was the underlying belief that reality is indeed intelligible, organized, and accessible. It must be highlighted that the basic idea that underlies all of this thought about the structure of the world is the acceptance of the idea that we can indeed know reality as it is in itself. This idea, popularly called realism, was the underlying thread that permeated most philosophies up until the early modern era in philosophy, which began in the 16th century. It seems like a simple idea, but it is one that unites the search for all forms of knowledge besides that of the strictly philosophical variety. This concept of realism is implicitly found in all of the sciences, which seeks to discover the nature of existent entities in so far as they are considered biologically, physically, etc. Indeed one could justly regard the academic enterprise folly if our ability to attain truth was considered impaired.

Philosophy began to be understood as the study of truth first with Socrates, Plato and Aristotle as a clearly demarcated field of truth in its highest categories. A constant theme for Plato was the nature of truth, and in various dialogues the type of knowledge that he considered genuinely philosophical relates to non-contingent essences which give existent entities their intelligibility and being as concrete particulars. In this way, the many facets of life can all be considered philosophically insofar as the essence of existent entities is the primary focus and not their intelligibility insofar as it relates to just any one other science (i.e., physics or biology).

The idea of philosophical knowledge as the study of truth in its highest categories could also be expressed by Aristotle in his phrase of philosophy as the study of “being qua being” in which he outlines his concept of first philosophy or metaphysics.⁵ By this, Aristotle was referring to a field of study that examines existent entities from the point of view of their existing as things in general. This would be opposed to an investigation

into the nature of things insofar as they hold interest as a psychological, physical, or neurological phenomenon. This was indicative of the classical idea that our ability to achieve truth is also an ability to step back and consider the world in its totality and not merely in reference to limited facets of its existence. This idea will become more important later when considering the role of phenomenology in restoring philosophy to its original objects and methods of investigation.

This focusing of the object of philosophy on the study of being also resulted in the separating off of the other sciences into their own fields of specificity. As such, physics became separated from metaphysics while fields such as neurology became separated from the philosophy of mind. Considering various topics philosophically, the objects of speculation then became more removed, in a certain sense, from the everyday sort of scientific investigation that a study of physics or biology would entail. Because of this, philosophy came to be viewed as more of a contemplative enterprise by those in the disciplines because its methods were not physical methods aimed towards certain aspects of existence, but rather contemplative methods aimed at existence as a whole. As far as justification of such a philosophical knowledge was concerned, the Greeks saw that the self-evidencing of ultimate phenomenon was necessary, for what other tools (such as the tools involved in biological, physical, or economic research) could possibly exist beyond universal phenomenon of features to study those features which are, by definition, the limits or structures of knowledge and of knowable entities?⁶ This concept will come back into the philosophical picture later with the general concern over the nature of the justification for philosophical knowledge.

One more fact that is worthy of note is the emergence of the formulation of the correspondence theory of truth, which holds that truth value is achieved when what is “in the mind” coordinates to what is “out there in the world.” According to this theory, when there is agreement (or

isomorphism) between the concept in the mind and the object of intellection there is truth.

Kant and the Question of Knowledge

This realist view was the general backdrop of the philosophical enterprise up until the early modern period when the paradigm began to shift. Starting with thinkers such as John Locke and Rene Descartes and culminating with Immanuel Kant, the ability to achieve truth and true knowledge was systematically challenged.

There are two general lines of concern that contribute to this shift. One reason for this, as Immanuel Kant mentions, is the general lack of surety or agreement between different philosophers.⁷ For example, one can point to certain mathematical or scientific texts as definitive in their respective fields, but we cannot do the same with philosophy. Because of this, there was a greater push for philosophy to be performed using methods akin to the precise proofs found in mathematics and the other physical sciences. From this general direction of concern came the eventual limiting of philosophy by various methods depending on the thinker. Whether it was economics, politics, or physics, philosophy was being constantly limited by various other fields of study that either intentionally or unintentionally sought to supplant the traditional methods of philosophy. However, the main influence on modern concerns about the possibility of attaining knowledge comes from the philosophical critiques of Immanuel Kant.

One important feature of Kant’s analysis that fueled his concerns about how knowledge exists was his synthetic-analytic/a priori-a posteriori distinction by which he characterized what is meant by different types of knowledge. According to Kant, there are statements that have a universal quality (i.e., the a priori) and statements that are empirical observations of singulars (i.e., the a posteriori). In the former (the a priori), a universal statement or determination is made that includes all possible entities referred to by the concept. One example of an a priori proposition

5. Aristotle, *The Metaphysics*, trans. John McMahon (Amhurst: Prometheus, 1991), 66.

6. See also: Aristotle, *The Metaphysics*, 71-85.

7. Immanuel Kant, *Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysics*, trans. Gary Hatfield (New York: Cambridge), 5-6.

would be “all men are rational animals.” In this proposition, a universal statement has been proclaimed about any currently or possible existing man.⁸

This is contrasted with the a posteriori statement in which a singular existing entity is referred to. An example of this style of proposition would be “this table is square.” In this statement, the nature of tables in general is not referred to but rather a quality of this particular table.

These categories could also be paired with the further categories of synthetic and analytic statements. An analytic statement is one in which the subject of the proposition has included within it the predicate with which it is adjoined. An example of an analytic statement would be “all bachelors are single” because within the concept of bachelor the quality of being single is already explicitly assumed. The other type of statement is the synthetic statement in which what is predicated of the subject is something that is not explicitly contained within the concept with which it is joined. An example of this type of statement would be “seven plus four equals eleven.” In this statement, the concept of eleven is not contained within the concepts of four or seven; something new is being said about the subject.

These categories of a priori/a posteriori and synthetic-analytic yield four combinations: analytic-a priori, analytic-a posteriori, synthetic-a posteriori, and synthetic-a priori. For Kant, it was this last category that true philosophical knowledge consists of as the synthetic-a priori statement is universal in nature and does not tautologically repeat whatever concept/predicate is contained explicitly with the subject. This was the genesis of the main question for all philosophers following in the footsteps of Kant: how do we seemingly attain knowledge of universals when we, as Hume thought and Kant agreed, only have (in one sense) experience of singulars?

This is where Kant’s famous “Copernican Revolution” in philosophy occurred. In this theory, Kant shifted the direction of the formation of thought from knowledge as passive receptivity to the

necessity of the objects of knowledge as being created by the mind of the inquirer. Presupposed in this theory was the Lockean concept of mind as an “internal screen” of sorts that projected to the ego the input or data from the senses. While Locke assumed constancy between the “external world” and the sensations “inside” the mind, Kant saw no reason to do so. One important reason for this is the fact that there is no way of investigating whether or not the world is as it is outside of our perceptions if our “internal” perceptions are all we can truly know.⁹

Because of this, Kant shifted the structuring element of reality from things in themselves to the human mind. For Kant, it was the mind that contained within itself the structures that made perception possible. The various structuring categories that Aristotle listed (quantity, quality, relation, etc.) that once were considered properties of things themselves were now posited as structures in the mind. Space and time were completely reduced to basic intuitions of the mind. Instead of being structures that were the order of the world, they became mental acts/intuitions that constitute or construct the world. Metaphysics, as the study of being qua being was practically reduced to studying the so-called a priori structures of the mind (psychologism). An unbridgeable gulf, theoretically speaking, thus emerged between thought and world. Because of this perceived gulf, the very idea of the achievement of knowledge became threatened because of the lack of direct access to the world.

These reasons, taken together, can be viewed as the starting point for the disintegration of philosophical thought into post-modernity, whether it is the post-modernity of Nietzsche and his family of followers or the scientism of Ayer and the other positivists. While the former of these two groups generally related more to our inability to achieve genuine philosophical knowledge of reality at all, it was the latter type that sought philosophical truth with a scientific (the physical sciences) methodology. It was primarily these two groups that the phenomenological

movement sought to respond to in its restoration of philosophy.

Edmund Husserl and the Origin of Phenomenology

Such problems formed the background for a young German mathematician-philosopher named Edmund Husserl when he sought to discover the basis of logic. Husserl wanted to find out where the inner necessity of logical concepts could come from and began to notice that the then-current Kantian-influenced strains of psychologistic philosophy could not ultimately or even adequately explain the necessity of such truth concepts. For example, if the mind is that which structures the world (and thus truth) then how could one explain the truth value of that statement (that the mind structures truth) in the first place?

To accomplish his goal, Husserl adapted the first-person introspective experiments of Gestalt psychology. He sought to eliminate philosophical confusion by returning to “the things themselves,” which he refers to as any phenomenon insofar as it is given to experience. This is important because, ultimately, our knowledge of the world comes from our experience of it, even if the idea of experience is much broader than some would be willing to recognize. In this sense Husserl sought to come to a direct intuition (intellectual apprehension) of the source of and evidence for the concepts/problems he was investigating. Through his method, he wanted philosophy to receive a fresh start.

With much hope and promise, Husserl thought the phenomenological movement had started to unravel the supposed problems and pseudo-problems of philosophy. However, the movement quickly fractured off into various schools such as the existentialists (e.g., Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, and De Beauvoir), the realists (e.g., Von Heidebrand, Scheler, and Stein), and the hermeneutic school (e.g., Ricoeur, Gadamer, Heidegger). While all of these schools have made their own unique contributions to phenomenology,

8. See also: Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. J. Meiklejohn (Amhurst: Prometheus, 1990), 1-18.

9. Robert Sokolowski, *Introduction to Phenomenology*, 8-11.

my reading and analysis is primarily influenced by the realist school as I believe it most clearly exemplifies, in one sense, a faithful continuation of Husserl's original vision for the phenomenological movement.

The Phenomenological Method

However, before proceeding with criticisms and responses to Kant and the positivists, it would be prudent to lay out the method that Husserl himself developed in order to proceed with his investigations. The method that Husserl developed was a series of steps that carefully sought to eliminate observer bias as much as possible and to increase the precision and objectivity of the reported experience. This set of methods is also known as the phenomenological reduction.

The first step of the method is called the "epoche." The epoche is a backing away from the standard way of mental participation in the world in which assumptions are (as best as is possible) left behind. This is the theoretical term that Husserl used to describe the theoretical openness held in contrast to the systemic constructions of certain contemporary analytic philosophers, as mentioned before. It refers to a sort of temporary suspension of belief in any feature of a phenomenon being any more essential than the other. In this sense, the observer equalizes all experienced phenomena as much as possible. Again, this is important because of the fact that it is easy for any observer to bring their prior assumptions about the essences of certain phenomena to bear on a situation or to unjustifiably limit the scope of essential possibility from the outset.¹⁰

An example of unintentionally bringing bias into an analysis would be if two individuals were analyzing a wire pyramid (one of the individuals being an ancient Egyptian who knew nothing of geometry, and the other being an ancient Greek geometrician who knew nothing of Egyptian pyramids) and a third individual asked them to describe the pyramid. The

observers would likely answer differently. While the former observer would undoubtedly bring religious beliefs about pyramids to bear on the analysis of the phenomenon, the geometrician would probably consider it as a teaching tool with his background as a mathematician. The problem is that both of these individuals have, in a way, already decided from the outset the essence of the wire pyramid because of the system of beliefs that they brought to bear in analyzing the phenomenon. The basic function behind the epoche could basically be described as performing the task of keeping the phenomenological observer's mind open so as not to exclude any phenomenon, possible data, or aspects of reality.

Related to this is the idea that phenomenological observers must, in light of this openness, describe what they are seeing to the best of their ability and not simply state what the phenomenon is right from the start: To state definitively what its essence is violates the principle of the epoche and the openness to evidence that it is supposed to engender. For example, if one were asked to give the essence of the color black, they would probably get a variety of responses from the observers. These answers would probably include black as either a color or the absence of color. However, if one were to point at a black object and describe it, they would probably respond simply, "black." In this way the difference between describing and defining can be seen as vital to the possible richness of things themselves.¹¹

The next step of the phenomenological reduction is related to the first: the phenomenon must be apodictic in its appearance. In other words, the phenomenon must be certain in appearance, even though the observer might not be certain as to what is exactly appearing before him. For example, if one were to observe and describe a coat and hat on a rack at the end of a dim hallway, he must only describe the phenomenon as it certainly appears to him; namely, as a phenomenon that presents itself in the appearance of either a person covering in

the hallway or as simply a hat and coat on a rack. This openness is important because, in a way, all of these features belong to the essence of the phenomenon. However, it is important to note that this reduction is simply a tool that will assist in maximizing the observed richness of the phenomenon and that assessing which aspects of the phenomenon are most essential will come much later in the process.

The feature of the process that follows the initial reduction is known as the phenomenological variation. In this method, as many different variations as are practical are performed on the phenomenon. Throughout this search for variations, invariants are looked for that governs the perceptions of the observer. It is through this analysis of invariants that a sense of finality is achieved although for some phenomenon it is only a relative finality. Through this method several regularities and formal structures were indeed discovered by Husserl. However, before going into some of the particular findings of phenomenology, an examination of the theoretical attitude implied by this method of openness should be laid out in order to clearly realize its implications for philosophy.¹³

The Phenomenological Attitude and the Domain of Evidence

As implied by its name, phenomenology is, tautologically, the study of phenomenon. In Husserl's view, this means literally any phenomenon insofar as it is given in perception. Any phenomenon such as religious experience, logic, or emotions may be evidence insofar as it is directly intuited (beheld or apprehended) by the one investigating. This feature is highly and purposely emphasized in order to keep a genuine openness so as not to exclude any possible data which could reveal something about reality. It is an openness akin to the ancient view of our ability to step back and look at the world in its totality.

In this way, phenomenology could be described as a radical empiricism, in

10. See also: Don Ihde, *Experimental Phenomenology: An Introduction*, (Albany: SUNY, 1986) 32.

11. Don Ihde, *Experimental Phenomenology: An Introduction*, 34.

12. Don Ihde, *Experimental Phenomenology: An Introduction*, 33.

13. See also: Robert Sokolowski, *Introduction to Phenomenology*, 179-180.

the sense that the definition of what is considered to be valid empirical evidence is not arbitrarily limited as it is in some systems of philosophical thought (such as that of the positivists). In logical positivism, as exemplified by A.J. Ayer, a statement can only be meaningful if it is either (1) empirically verifiable or (2) a logical tautology (analytic a priori statement); that is, a statement where the predicate is contained within the subject (i.e., All bachelors are unmarried: the concept of bachelor already references the state of not being married).¹⁴

The point made against this notion by phenomenologists is that the largely physical-centered criteria of empirical evidence that the positivist uses implicitly assumes that the only kind of verifiable existence is of the physical. The phenomenological criticism of this first point is important because it reveals the generally arbitrary and non-necessary character of the positivist notion of the empirical. By outlining what the domain of suitable or valid evidence is, the positivist assumes the very point that they are attempting to prove when they attack metaphysical notions.

One other example that would be helpful in illustrating the positivist assumption is an analysis of the foundational character of the logic that positivists assume in any analysis that they give (in particular the principle of non-contradiction: that something cannot be true and non-true in the same sense and at the same time). According to their own principles of “empirical observation” positivists would be wholly unable to ground the very logic they depend on for their system of thought because logical “entities” cannot be analyzed in the way that contingent physical features can be analyzed.

One further point that follows from this in regard to the second criteria of positivism is the fact that the principle of non-contradiction is not itself an analytical statement: it is synthetic. In the statement that “(A) cannot be (non-A),” the concept of any being does not explicitly

contain within itself reference to its own negation (to what it is not). This statement conditions all of our thinking about any possible conditions of reality. Because of this, the aforementioned proposition, while existing as a material element of existence, must also subsist as a formal element that reaches out to all real and possible beings.¹⁵ This is important to note as this is a basic axiom to be accepted and intuited if the life of reason is to be entered at all. To enter into any rational discussion or discourse is to implicitly assume the universal validity of the principle of non-contradiction.

The basic character of the phenomenological objections could be phrased as follows: why should topics such as metaphysics or ethics be considered any less real because they are not able to be verified in the way that a physical object can be by an “objective” party of observers? While it is, admittedly, difficult to verify logical and metaphysical phenomenon, it only can be prejudicial towards the search for truth if all possible evidence is not taken into consideration. This inquiry becomes truly philosophical when the categories of acceptable evidence are broadened to include anything that appears to the observer. This is the attitude that early thinkers had when they viewed philosophy as a stepping back from the world to be able to view it in its totality. As shown in the next section, the findings of this method and attitude have cleared away much of the ambiguity that surrounded much of the critical problem in modern philosophy.

Some Specific Findings: Objections, Responses, and Implications

The plan for this philosophical method was simple: with the phenomenological reduction in play, the phenomenologist was to seek out the invariant features in experience (i.e., essences) that characterized it or appeared in it. When this was done, one phenomenon quickly started to re-occur as basic: intentionality. By this term, Husserl referred to the idea that all of our thoughts or perceptions were about something. Husserl acquired

this idea of intentionality from his teacher Franz Brentano, who in turn acquired this notion from the tradition of Aristotle and his medieval followers. This idea states that all of our experiences (thinking, willing, etc.) are always about something.¹⁶

With this, Husserl noted that there is a basic shape to experience: the object perceived and the accompanying act of perception which invariably and necessarily accompanies the object. He termed the object of perception the “noema” or “noematic object,” and he termed the mental act of disclosure the “noesis” or “noetic act.” In this basic structure of intentional consciousness, the self or ego is only implicitly assumed as the bearer of experience and is not a direct object of “introspection.”¹⁷

Superficially, this observation of intentionality perhaps seems rather dull and unnecessary until one begins to unpack all of what is implied by this statement. According to Locke and Kant, what we are directly aware of is an image in our consciousness. However, if one were to thoroughly analyze his or her experiences of phenomenon, an experience of pure consciousness would nowhere be encountered, but only the things themselves. Because of this, the theoretical doorway from our minds to the world is demolished; the bridge between mind and world is revealed as a pseudo-problem. Knowledge is once more theoretically viable because of the bridging of mind and world.

Another piece of evidence against Kant would be the phenomenological experience of the logically objective nature of Kant’s claims. For example, if the limits for truth are the a priori structures of the mind, then there is no way Kant could objectively make that claim, for then the logic that he uses would be above and prior to his mind, ontologically speaking. Again, if all that can be (in terms of knowledge) is what the mind forms, then describing the nature of the mind would be impossible to objectively do. This phenomenon of experienced truth in that case does not at all match up with what Kant has said about

14. A.J. Ayer, *Language, Truth, and Logic* (New York: Dover, 1952) 5.

15. Dietrich Von Hildebrand, *What is Philosophy?* 84-85.

16. See also: Robert Sokolowski, *Introduction to Phenomenology*, 8-16.

17. See also: Don Ihde, *Experimental Phenomenology: An Introduction*, 43-50.

the nature of how the mind conditions truth. In this aspect, Kant's theory does not match up with what presents itself to the mind of the honest phenomenological observer. In this way, knowledge is observed to be a passive receptivity in which we receive knowledge in accordance with our attentiveness to the phenomenon.¹⁸

However, while the aforementioned evidential phenomenon supports the phenomenological position, there are some phenomena that support other theories of the mind. One example that could imply a Kantian model of the mind would be hallucinations. The question could be posed as such: if we truly experience the world as it is, then how does one explain the nature of hallucinations (which are implicitly assumed as not truly of the world). However, there are equally suitable explanations for hallucinations that lend themselves just as much, logically speaking, to a direct realist model of consciousness (wherein we directly behold the world as it is) as postulated by ancient and medieval philosophers. As such, there is not truly as much reason to consider mind as separate from the world, especially if our conscious experiences of the world are inseparably and intentionally related to it.

The objection could still be made against phenomenology that one cannot see and verify the universals that we use in logic and as such must exclude them. However, this line of objection exemplifies the type of automatic exclusion that the openness of the epoche was designed to create. Because we experience universals or logical principles as somehow or another "in the world," then philosophical patience, attentiveness, and diligence become required to delve into their secrets, rather than an automatic exclusion of relevant information that could provide genuine insight into the true nature of things just because they do not fit into a pre-constructed paradigm. Truth is something that gains its meaning from the fact that it is not all revealable at the same time. There is often the implicit assumption that whatever is knowable must be something which is accessible to everybody at every time, which is not necessarily the case.

Another line of objection concerns the justification of beliefs about the nature of the mind and world. How can one justify the basic principles of experience, phenomenologically speaking, with something beyond the experience of reality if one is not to head into an infinite regress? There often seems to be theoretical grounds for doubting our perceptions (in the manner of Descartes even).

One answer would be that, as the ancients thought, there must be something self-justifying about our experience of things in the world. It would also be accurate to state that the kind of surety that such objectors require is not even possible, in principle, because of the fact that truth or its justification is not something that can be taken by force or possessed as a mere object in the world. In addition, the discovery of deception implies that a certain truth relating to the actual state of affairs has been intuited. The apprehension of entities comes prior to any other intellectual stance that one can take toward them. In this way it can be seen how any organized attempt to doubt apprehension is futile, as any attempt to doubt an object pre-supposes its prior existence.

Phenomenology as the Continuation of the Classical Notion of Philosophy

Throughout all of the phenomenological objections put forward against some modern philosophies, one general trend exists: namely, the idea that the ability to participate in the world is knowledge. To even begin rational discussion, our ability to achieve truth is implicitly assumed. Because of these ideas and findings of phenomenology, the debris caused by several centuries of philosophical rubble is cleared in order to let philosophy flourish as it was originally formulated. This is not to say that the movement has generated solutions to all of the philosophical problems out there; there is much yet to be solved. I believe that it is only the case that phenomenology has cleared a pathway for future contributions to the field. Again, the tools of phenomenology are not strictly

meant as a new way of doing philosophy but rather as a much clearer expression and development of what it was originally intended to be.

18. Dietrich Von Hildebrand, *What is Philosophy?* 13-25.

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