Faculty Scholarly Dissemination Grants

The Separability Problem in Referendum Elections: Some Recent Developments

Department

Mathematics

College

College of Liberal Arts and Sciences

Date Range

2011-2012

Abstract

In referendum elections, voters are often required to register simultaneous votes on multiple proposals. The separability problem, first identified in the late 1990s, occurs when a voter's preferences on one or more proposals depend on the known or predicted outcomes of other proposals. Here we survey several recent developments pertaining to the separability problem, including: (1) structural properties of interdependent preferences; (2) the impact of separability on election outcomes; (3) causes and models of nonseparability; and (4) the potential of iterative voting to solve the separability problem. All of these results involve contributions from undergraduates, some of whom will be in attendance at the session.

Conference Name

Joint Meetings of the American Mathematical Society and the Mathematical Association of America

Conference Location

Boston, MI

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