The Personalism of Putin's Regime

Presentation Type

Oral and/or Visual Presentation

Presenter Major(s)

Political Science

Mentor Information

Heather L. Tafel, tafelh@gvsu.edu

Department

Political Science

Location

Kirkhof Center 2215

Start Date

13-4-2011 4:30 PM

End Date

13-4-2011 5:00 PM

Keywords

Freedom and Control, Historical Perspectives, World Perspective

Abstract

Research has shown that Vladimir Putin has a loyal base of supporters which allows him to have a strong unchallenged authoritarian rule in Russia. I argue that the current regime is characterized by a personalistic rule. I plan to demonstrate the ways that Putin has maintained his personalistic support within his own party, United Russia, and amongst other prominent political and economic elites. First I demonstrate how Putin strategically balances rival clans, the conservative siloviki and St. Petersburg liberals. Secondly, I show how Putin's appointments to state-owned companies have increased his support. Thirdly, I discuss patronage in the regime and the grand bargain between United Russia and Putin allowing them to lobby for special interests in exchange for support. Lastly, I will discuss the emerging formation of a personality cult that creates popular support outside the regime, and its contribution to Putin's ability to maintain control over Russia.

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Apr 13th, 4:30 PM Apr 13th, 5:00 PM

The Personalism of Putin's Regime

Kirkhof Center 2215

Research has shown that Vladimir Putin has a loyal base of supporters which allows him to have a strong unchallenged authoritarian rule in Russia. I argue that the current regime is characterized by a personalistic rule. I plan to demonstrate the ways that Putin has maintained his personalistic support within his own party, United Russia, and amongst other prominent political and economic elites. First I demonstrate how Putin strategically balances rival clans, the conservative siloviki and St. Petersburg liberals. Secondly, I show how Putin's appointments to state-owned companies have increased his support. Thirdly, I discuss patronage in the regime and the grand bargain between United Russia and Putin allowing them to lobby for special interests in exchange for support. Lastly, I will discuss the emerging formation of a personality cult that creates popular support outside the regime, and its contribution to Putin's ability to maintain control over Russia.